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ARTICLES
THE PROFESSIONAL BONDSMAN:
A STATE ACTION ANALYSIS
JIM MICHAEL HANSEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
If it is true that the quality of a nation's civilization can be largely
measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its crim-
inal law, then the American bail system as it now operates can
no longer be tolerated. At best, it is a system of checkbook
justice; at worst, a highly commercialized racket.'
T HE PROFESSIONAL BAIL BONDSMAN SYSTEM, antiquated and replete
with documented deficiencies, remains in "full and odorous bloom"'
throughout much of the United States. Although the founding axioms of
the commercial bail system are contemporarily suspect and have been
challenged by both jurists and commentators, reform has largely failed
to eliminate the corporation surety as a cornerstone of the bail process.'
This Article is premised upon the axiom that the bail bondsman
system is as persevering as it is draconian and is a reality which must
be addressed if not eliminated. While the wheels of legislative reform
turn slowly in quest of a remedy for the system and "all its abuses, ' it
is pragmatic to direct attention to one small cure, to wit, the legal
redress which may be sought by a principal who has been deprived of
his rights by the bondsman 5 through exercise of the latter's quasi-police
powers of arrest and retrieval.
* Law Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. B.A.,
M.S., Cleveland State University; J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
'A. Goldberg, forward to R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM, A CRITIQUE OF THE
AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM ix (1965) [hereinafter cited as RANSOM].
2 Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 359 (1971), referring to the Illinois profes-
sional bail bondsman system which existed prior to legislative reform.
' Unfortunately, the following prophecy has failed to materialize: "The future
of the surety bail can be summarized simply: It has no future. It does not now
perform any important system function and will not long remain a part of the
criminal justice system." W. THOMAS, BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 254 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as BAIL REFORM].
' Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. at 359, referring to the Illinois bail system.
' The terms bondsman, surety, corporate and commercial bondsman are used
interchangeably throughout this Article as are the terms accused, defendant and
principal.
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Bondsmen typically enjoy the statutory right to arrest their prin-
cipals, which is derived from the common law right established by the
Supreme Court over one hundred years ago. This right includes the
authority to break and enter a principal's house without a warrant for
purpose of arrest. In short, "the bail [bondsmen] have their principal on
a string, and may pull the string whenever they please."'
Principals who have been subjected to illegal or excessive arrest pro-
cedures by the bondsman have secured only minimal redress in state
judicial forums upon initiating tort actions founded upon false imprison-
ment, trespass and assault and battery. This Article will explore how an
abused principal can attempt to secure legal redress in the federal
forum, utilizing 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a cause of action
for violations of constitutional rights incurred "under color of" law, the
conceptual statutory equivalent of fourteenth amendment "state
action." Whether the nexus between the private bondsman and the
state is sufficient to transform the private conduct of the bondsman into
action of the state for section 1983 purposes has resulted in contradic-
tory judicial pronouncements which must be reconciled and examined in
light of recent Supreme Court "state action" decisions. The difficulty of
this analysis is compounded by the Supreme Court's inability to for-
mulate a clear and coherent state action doctrine. The Supreme Court's
attempt to differentiate between private and state action has resulted
in what has been aptly noted a "conceptual disaster area."8 This Article
will attempt to apply state action analysis to the commercial bondsman
process in an effort to determine whether section 1983 actions are
cognizable against bondsmen and their agents.
II. THE BAIL BOND SYSTEM
A. Nature of the Bail Bond System
"Certainly the professional bondsman system .. . is odious at best. ..
An understanding of the nature of the bail bond system is essential to
6 Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371-72 (1872).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in full:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State of Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).
' Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword "State Action, "Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv L. REV. 69, 95 (1967). For a
compendium of several major state action treatises see Glennon & Nowak, A
Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action "Requirement,
1976 SuP. CT. REV. 221, 227 nn.24-25 (1976). See also references in note 156 infra.
' Judge Skelly Wright observed in Pannel v. United States, 320 F.2d 698
(D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J., concurring):
[Vol. 30:595
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this discussion. Pretrial release, whether by bail, personal recognizance
or some other method, is premised upon the maxim that every indiv-
idual is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt." However, it does not follow that every person is innocent.
Accordingly, any statutory system of pretrial release must be flexible
enough to permit the judiciary to balance the accused's right to freedom
with the right of society to assure his presence at trial. Factors com-
monly codified include the nature and circumstances of the alleged of-
fense and the accused's prior arrest record, prior record of appearance,
economic status, family and community status, character and mental
condition." When these factors are such that release on personal
recognizance is deemed insufficient to assure the future presence of the
accused, bail or other conditional release may be required or release
denied altogether.2
Certainly the professional bondsman system is odious at best. The ef-
fect of such a system is that the professional bondsmen hold the keys to
the jail in their pockets. They determine for whom they will act as
surety- who in their judgment is a good risk. The bad risks, in the bonds-
men's judgment, and the ones who are unable to pay the bondsmen's
fees, remain in jail. The court and the commissioner are relegated to
the relatively unimportant chore of fixing the amount of bail.
Id. at 699. The bondsman may accordingly withhold his services arbitrarily
without judicial influence or review. See Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan
RailProject. An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV.
67 (1963). Three years subsequent to Justice Wright's opinion the "keys to the
jail" were taken from the bondsman and returned to the court. See Bail Reform
Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3156 (1969), as discussed in note 43 infra and accom-
panying text.
"I The Supreme Court has aptly stated:
This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the
unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the inflic-
tion of punishment prior to conviction, See Hudson v. Parker, 1895, 156
U.S. 257, 285, 15 S.Ct. 450, 453, 39 L.Ed. 424. Unless this right to bail
before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only
after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 3 (1951). Accord, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362
(1970); Dudley v. United States, 242 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1957); Sistrunk v. Lyong,
646 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1971). See also Mostyn, Bail and the Presumption of In-
.nocence, 61 LAW. SocY's GAZETTE 799 (1964).
" See note 127 infra for compilation of applicable state statutes. The Bail
Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3156, which has been emulated by Alaska,
Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Ver-
mount, Wisconsin and Wyoming, directs the judicial officer to examine
the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the
evidence against the accused, the accused's family ties, employment,
financial resources, character and mental condition, the length of his
residence in the community, his record of conviction, and his record of
appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or
failure to appear at court proceedings.
18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (1966). See also 8 AM JUR. 2d Bail and Recognizance § 7 (1980);
Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1385 (1967) (insanity of accused as affecting right to bail).
12 Statutes or state constitutional provisions which permit the prohibition of
1981]
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With the exception of a discrete and progressive minority, all states
permit utilization of a corporate or professional surety release.,3 The
surety, or professional bondsman, is typically a licensed insurance agent
who executes a contract whereby the accused tenders a nonreturnable
premium or fee (usually ten percent of the bond) and the surety agrees
to execute a second contract with the appropriate statutory official
(usually the sheriff or a judicial officer). The accused is then released to
the custody of the surety and the surety pledges that the accused will
attend all judicial proceedings. If he fails to do so, the surety will be
financially accountable for the face amount of the bond. The surety-
accused contract invariably authorizes the former to arrest and sur-
render the latter at any time in exoneration of the surety's liability to
the sovereign, 4 as the accused is deemed to be in the continued custody
of the surety.
B. The Problem
"The professional bondsman is an anachronism in the criminal
process. Close analysis of his role indicates he serves no major
purpose that could not be better served by public officers at less
cost in economic and human terms."'5
Support for the eradication of bail systems wherein the bondsman
serves as the cornerstone began in the early 1960's as a result of studies
which indicated that alternate methods of pretrial release, discussed
pretrial release when the alleged offense is captial, where the proof is evident or
the presumption great, or where the accused is adjudged a "danager to the
community," are inherently at tension with the proscription of the eighth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, that "excessive bail shall not be re-
quired." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See generally Hruska, Preventive Detention:
The Constitution and Congress, 3 CREIGHTON L. REv. 36 (1969); Meyer, Constitu-
tionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEo. L.J. 1140 (1972); Mitchell, Bail Reform
and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1123 (1969).
'" See notes 33-49, 110-25 infra and accompanying text.
" The courts have upheld the validity of such contracts. See Leary v. United
States, 224 U.S. 567, 575 (1912); United States v. Trunko, 189 F. Supp. 559, 565
(E.D. Ark. 1960).
A typical contract is provided at 3 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2d Bail and
Recognizance § 35.26 (surrender of principal); 4 AM. JUR. PL. & PR. FORMS (REV.)
Bail and Recognizance, Forms 91, 92 (authority to arrest principal). See also
Note, Indemnification Contracts in the Law of Bail, 35 VA. L. REV. 496, 500
(1949).
'- A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE 64-65 (1968) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A.
STANDARDS]. To a similar effect:
Two principal arguments have thus far been advanced by the bondsmen
to justify their continued existence: (1) Without their services, the
failure to appear rate of defendants would skyrocket; and (2) They are
necessary to apprehend defendants who skip out on their bail and flee
prosecution. Both claims are quite clearly false.
BAIL REFORM, supra note 3, at 255.
[Vol. 30:595
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below, would adequately assure the presence of the accused without
implementation of a corporate surety. 8 Analysis of the corporate surety
reveals that the bondsman lacks contemporary functional utility and
further serves his quasi-judicial function in a manner which discredits
an otherwise relatively integrated judicial system. What little service
the bondsman may provide to the accused or to the sovereign is heavily
outweighed by the pattern of institutional corruption and absence of in-
ternal and external accountability which has attended the existence of
the bondsman.
The bondsman's lack of functional utility arises in part from a failure
to satisfy one of the primary justifications for the inception of the bail
system, that is, service to the judicial system by assuring the appear-
ance of the accused. 7 Once release is procured, contract between the
surety and the client is often de minimus, typically limited to a notice of
the impending trial date. 8 The bondsman's ability to foreclose on a col-
1" The catalyst for bail reform was the Manhattan Bail Project, conducted in
1960 by the Vera Foundation, which promulgated guidelines which the New York
City courts successfully utilized to release defendants using methods other than
corporate bail. See Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An In-
terim Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 67, 71-75 (1963).
t17 The justifications for the corporate surety are derived from the deviation
between historical England and the United States. Historically, England released
individuals upon recognizance of the accused, the accused's family or friends. The
fear of banishment from the country and confiscation of land and status provided
the incentive against bail jumping. This method proved unadaptable to America
which from its inception was uncharted, mobile and not land oriented. Instead, a
system of pretrial release was instituted which required financial deposit as a
prerequisite. Individuals without friends, property or the financial ability to
satisfy the face value of the bail secured the services of a professional bondsman
whose position grew as a natural consequence of the commercial bail system. For
a fee, the bondsman would service the client by enabling pretrial release and ser-
vice the sovereign by assuring the appearance of the accused and continued
custody of the accused. These two primary justifications for the existence of the
bondsman have become antiquated. For further historical discussion, see Note,
Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 699 (1961); E. D. HAAS, AN-
TIQUITIES OF BAIL (1940); RANSOM, supra note 1, at 6-32, 93-94 (a concise evolution
of the bondsman); see also 2 POLLACK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 589, 590 (2d ed. 1899).
18 Not only is little required of bondsmen legally, but also they actually do
very little in terms of service. Often bondsmen lose track of defendants,
maintain mimimal contact with them before trial, or merely send a
reminder note to the defendant to assure his presence for trial. They do
very little work for their money. Criticizing bondsmen for forgetting even
to advise their clients to appear for trial, one Rhode Island Superior
Court judge accused them of "wallowing in wealth" and being "too busy
collecting money to be bothered carrying out their obligations."
RANSOM, supra note 1, at 101. Note, however, that more recent commentators
have presented a less optimistic picture of the bondsman's financial success. See
P. WICE, FREEDOM FOR SALE 53-55 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FREEDOM FOR SALE]
(bail reform projects result in release of the best potential clients). Wice concurs,
19811
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lateral pledge or obtain judicial postponement of forfeiture of the bond
until the accused has been apprehended by the police has diminished
the surety's initiative to assure the appearance of the accused. 9 The
other primary justification for the presence of the bondsman, that of
service to the client by enabling pretrial release through a financially-
based bail system, has been nullified by the advent of alternative, non-
financial pretrial release methods. 0 As a result, the bondsman's services
are usually unnecessary.
The commercial bondsman operates with an alarming absence
of internal or external accountability. This has predictably re-
sulted in abusive procedures and practices which have caused both
jurists and commentators to attach such terms as "low-lifes, '"
however, in the the conclusion that the bondsman fails to maintain adequate con-
tact with the principal:
Although several bondsmen worked long and hard at maintaining ade-
quate contact with their clients, the majority seemed to be lax and merely
assumed that the defendant would appear for trial. It was only when the
defendant failed to appear that the bondsman would spring into action
and work through his network of informants and "skip tracers," modern
day bounty hunters, to retrieve the missing defendant.
Id at 58. See also, J. MURPHY, ARREST BY POLICE COMPUTER 41 (1977) thereinafter
cited as POLICE COMPUTER] ("the assumed custodial efforts and dominion by the
surety-for-profit over the defendant during the period of release are simply nonex-
istent."); Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bai" 1, 113 U. PA. L. REV.
1125, 1162 (1965) (referring to the bondsman's claims of significant custodial ser-
vices as "frivolous").
"9 The Illinois legislature, upon promulgating theretofore unknown and unique
bail reform, noted:
As the value of bondsmen being responsible for the appearance of accused
and tracking him down and returning him at the bondsmans' expense - the
facts do not support this as an important factor. While such is accomp-
lished occasionally without expense to the county, the great majority of
bail jumpers are apprehended by the police of this and other states.
Since bail jumping is now a distinct and separate crime, and with the
nation-wide exchange of information between law enforcement agencies
and the F.B.I., the average bail jumper has little chance of escape. The
facts show that most of them are recaptured in this state, and even in
the same county where they are to appear.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-1-§ 110-17 (Smith-Hurd) (Committee Comments,
1963, revised in 1970 by Charles H. Bowman).
20 See notes 33-49 infra and accompanying text.
21 One of the forefathers of bail reform, Ronald Goldfarb, has stated:
Who is this quasi-public servant for whom the law has created this
sinecure? Many, too many, agents are undesirable persons, former
felons, and generally repugnant characters. Some bondsmen are colorful
Runyonesque characters. Some are legitimate businessmen. But too
many are "low-lifes" whose very presence contaminates the judicial pro-
cess.
[V]ery frequently, if not generally, the bail bondsman is an unappealing
and useless member of society. He lives on the law's inadequacy and his
fellowman's troubles. He give nothing in return, or so little as to serve
[Vol. 30:595
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"evil"22 and "unconscionable 2 3 to the corporate surety. Virtually every
study of the bondsman has revealed a pattern of institutional corrup-
tion, including connection with organized crime, kickbacks and payoffs
to defense attorneys and judicial officers who refer the accused to the
bondsman, bribes and abuse of the forfeiture pledge by obtaining grace
periods during which the bondsman may attempt to surrender the ac-
cused.24 Too often an accused is charged exorbitant fees in excess of
statutory limitations for only a relatively short period of freedom."
no overriding utilitarian purpose. Society must share the blame for this
creature. Our system created him.
RANSOM, supra note 1, at 101-02. Other commentators have advanced a less
critical opinion of the bondsman. See also The Plain Dealer, August 3-8, 1980
(series of articles and editorials entitled "The Freedom Sellers").
' Feeney, forward to BAIL REFORM, supra note 3, at xi:
As one solution, the book suggests what nearly every current observer
of the bail scene already knows: At a minimum, the present system of
commercial surety bail should be simply and totally abolished. Whatever
it may have accomplished in the past, it is now an anachronism. It is not
so much that bondsmen are evil-although they sometimes are-but
rather that they serve no useful purpose. The only benefit that they
serously claim to confer-that of catching persons who jump bail-is
largely illusory.
Id.
The Supreme Court has observed:
The commercial bail bondsman has long been an anathema to the criminal
defendant seeking to exercise his right to pretrial release. In theory,
courts were to set such amounts and conditions of bonds as were nec-
essary to secure the appearance of defendants at trial [citations
omitted]. Those who did not have the resources to post their own bond
were at the mercy of the bondsman who could exact exorbitant fees and
unconscionable conditions for acting as surety. [citations to articles omit-
ted]. Criminal defendants often paid more in fees to bondsmen for secur-
ing their release than they were later to pay in penalties for their
crimes.
Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 373-74 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
24 The practice of postponing or obtaining grace periods in which to void
forfeiture of the bond is particularly prevalent in Cleveland, Ohio. L. KATZ & D.
CLANCY, REPORT ON BAIL IN CUYAHOGA COUNTY 43, 47 (Dec. 1975); The Plain
Dealer, Dec. 23, 1978, at A-12, col. 1. See generally, RANSOM, supra note 1, at
103-15 (excellent discussion undiminished by time); FREEDOM FOR SALE, supra
note 18; see also United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978) (2 state
court magistrates convicted of racketeering for accepting 50% of bond premiums
from bondsmen as a kick-back).
25 After release, the bondsman may become privy to additional information
about the accused, the nature of the crime or the strength of the state's evidence,
and may decide to arrest and surrender the individual into the custody of the
sovereign, usually without return of the ten percent fee. See FREEDOM FOR SALE,
supra note 18, at 62. The bondsman-principal contract which permits surrender
of the accused without a return of the fee was unsuccessfully challenged as "il-
legal" in Smith v. Rosenbaum, 333 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1019
(3d Cir. 1972). These practices are in dire need of legislative reform.
Methods by which bondsmen may attempt to circumvent a statutory limita-
tion or the amount of fee chargeable were revealed in Citizens for Pre-Trial
19811
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The most pronounced and potentially dangerous absence of bondsman
accountability is the surety's virtually unlimited authority to arrest and
surrender the principal without resort to legal process or a search war-
rant. Thus, the bondsman is permitted to circumvent the fourth amend-
ment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures which
attaches to law enforcement personnel acting under color of law. 6 The
bondsman, untrained in arrest procedures and medical techniques, may
therefore do that which the qualified police officer performing under color
of uniform cannot, all for the purpose (as far as the bondsman is concerned)
of preventing a forfeiture of the bond and thereby securing a profit
from the bail undertaking." Not surprisingly, the bondsman's utilization
of this quasi-police power of arrest, which has been conspicuously unac-
companied by a corresponding judicial or statutory regulatory system of
control, has resulted in tragedy to principals whose only offense was
that of having been charged with a crime and who were forced to utilize
the services of a bondsman to obtain pretrial release. Both the judiciary
and commentators have documented the violence and death which have
attended Procrustean arrests."6
Justice v. Goldfarb, 88 Mich. App. 519, 278 N.W.2d 653 (1979) (court held that
bondsmen could charge only 100/o of bondsmens' risk; also, taking collateral
which, alone or with premium charged, exceeded 10% of face value on bond
violated the statute).
2' Discussed in note 53 infra and accompanying text.
I The bondsman appears to be unique in possessing the authority to arrest,
which traditionally has been exclusively reserved to the sovereign to protect and
promote the public welfare for the purpose of preventing a financial loss through
forfeiture of the bond. Although business operators are often statutorily
authorized to detain or arrest suspected shoplifters (which in essence is to pre-
vent financial loss), such are distinguishable from bondsmen since businessmen
detain or arrest an individual breaking the law, but bondsmen arrest an in-
dividual who has breached a bond contract. For a discussion of business operators
see Thompson v. McCoy, 425 F. Supp. 407 (D.S.C. 1976); DeCarlo v. Joseph Horne
and Co., 251 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Pa. 1966), and statutes cited therein; Note, The
Merchant, the Shoplifter and the Law, 55 MINN. L. REV. 825 (1971).
It is ironic that under attachment and garnishment law creditors may
"arrest" property in the possession of the debtor only upon satisfying due pro-
cess requirements, but a bondsman, whose interest is essentially that of a
creditor, may arrest an individual without the same constitutional safeguards.
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.03, Ohio's prejudgment attachment
statute, which was held violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, §§ 1, 16 and 19 of the Ohio
Constitution. Peebles v. Clement, 63 Ohio St. 2d 314, 408 N.E.2d 689 (1980). See
also Fuentes v. Sheven, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), where two summary repossession
statues which failed to provide the debtor with a minimal due process hearing
before the issuance of a writ of replevin ordering state seizure of the property at
issue were held violative of the fourteenth amendment.
28 See, e.g., Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns 145 (N.Y. 1810) ("great roughness"
used); Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822) (assault and imprisonment); State v.
Lingerfelt, 109 N.C. 775, 14 S.E. 75 (1891) (principal shot and killed by surety's
bounty hunter while resisting arrest); McCaleb v. Peerless Insurance Co., 250 F.
Supp. 512 (D. Neb. 1965) (principal handcuffed and driven around state for eighty
[Vol. 30:595
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The extent to which the authority of arrest has been and will continue
to be utilized is not highly visible nor subject to empirical examination
since such utilization is a function of several variables, including the
following: the frequency at which the judiciary requires corporate
bonds; the statutory or judicial regulation or control of the bondsman;
and the number of principals who "skip bond" and the number of those
who are not reapprehended by the police. 9 Also, an abused principal
may be deterred from initiating civil litigation against the surety if in-
carcerated as a result of the original charge for which bail was required
or if he is financially unable to do so."9 Accordingly, the number of in-
hours); Shine v. State, 44 Ala. App. 171, 204 So. 2d 817 (1967) (bondsman killed by
principal resisting arrest); Livingston v. Browder, 51 Ala. App. 366, 285 So. 2d
923 (1973) (house of principal's mother forcefully entered); Poteete v. Olive, 527
S.W.2d 84 (Tenn. 1975) (bounty hunter broke principal's leg); United States v.
Trunko, 189 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Ark. 1960) (principal arrested at night, handcuffed,
driven non-stop from Arkansas to Ohio); Thomas v. Miller, 282 F. Supp. 571 (E.D.
Tenn. 1968) (principal chained and forced to ride on car floor); Maynard v, Kear,
474 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (principal assaulted, handcuffed and dragged
out of apartment clothed only in underwear in January); Dunkin v. Lamb, 500 F.
Supp. 184 (D. Nev. 1980) (bondsman utilized excessive force in presence of police
who refused to intervene); Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (principal
beaten and robbed by bounty hunters); Austin v. State, 541 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.
App. 1976) (forceful entry, principal assaulted and handcuffed). See also Foote,
Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U.
PA. L. REV. 1031, 1067 (1954); FREEDOM FOR SALE, supra note 18, at 31 (citing one
instance where a bondsman had vowed to return the principal "dead or alive,"
and another where an innocent third party was shot and killed at 2:00 a.m. while
resisting a bounty hunter who mistakenly believed the victim was a principal);
RANSOM, supra note 1, at 117-18 (citing instance where four bounty hunters forced
a couple into their custody at gunpoint and, representing themselves as FBI
agents, held them captive for eleven hours, questioning them about the
whereabouts of a bail jumper); Note, Bailbondsmen and the Fugitive Ac-
cused- the Need for Formal Removal Procedures, 73 YALE L.J. 1098 (1964):
Interviews with bondsmen reveal that some bondsmen pursue bail-
jumpers even where adequate security has been given by a third-party
indemnitor, in order to maintain a reputation for relentless pursuit as a
general psychological deterrent to flight.
Id at 1106 n.40; Note, The Hunter and the Hunted: Rights and Liabilities of
Bondsmen, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 333 (1978).
' However, even conservative speculation denotes the magnitude of the ex-
tent to which the arrest authority is utilized by the bondsman. Since it has been
estimated that at least ten to twelve million bonds are issued per calendar year
(see RANSOM, supra note 1, at 96), it can be assumed conservatively that only ten
percent (1,000,000) of these are corporate bonds. It can be further assumed that
the nonappearance rate documented in Illinois as ten percent is generally
representative of the country. See BAIL REFORM, supra note 3, at 255. The conclu-
sion is that 6,000 arrests per year will be made by bondsmen.
' These barriers have surfaced in the context of individuals abused by law
enforcement officials. See, e.g., Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contem-
porary Social Problems, 3 U. CIN. L. REV. 345, 352 (1936); Foote, Tort Remedies
for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493, 507 (1955); Gold-
stein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,
69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1165 n.48 (1960).
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stances in which abuses have been documented must be considered as
representative of a larger class.
It is posited that even one abusive arrest is too many. The authority
to arrest should exist solely with law enforcement personnel who are
subject to internal policy accountability, statutory and constitutional
restrictions both procedural and substantive in nature, physical and
medical training, and whose ability to retrieve such principals has been
facilitated through the advent of modern interstate communications and
methods of record keeping. 1 Few states, however, have implemented
reform in this area.
32
C. The Solution
"Certainly the legislature could take cognizance of the in-
herent evils and abuses of the compensated surety in the bail
bond system."3
One method of reform or solution to the foregoing problem consists of
statutory or judicial regulation and control of the bondsman. Both have
been attempted in varying degrees in the majority of states and in
many municipalities. 4 The typical regulation establishes conditions for
31 See POLICE COMPUTER, supra note 18, strongly advocating this position.
32 Illinois, Oregon and Kentucky have eliminated the use of the corporate
bond. In those states which have retained the corporate bond as a method of
pretrial release, only New Jersey, South Carolina and Maryland do not expressly
or implicitly provide statutory authority for the bondsman to arrest. Connecticut
permits only law enforcement officers to arrest the principal. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 54-65, 52-319 (West 1980 & Supp. 1980).
Texas requires that the bondsman obtain an arrest warrant. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. § 17.19 (Vernon 1977). This statute is exclusive of the common law
rights of the bondsman as established in Taylor v. Tainter, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366
(1872), and noncompliance with this statute exposses the bondsman to a false im-
prisonment action. See Austin v. Texas, 541 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
While this statute imposes some restrictions on the bondsman's virtually un-
limited common law arrest powers, this superficial reform is insufficient to ade-
quately protect the principal since the bondsman still retains the ultimate
authority to effectuate an arrest.
Stephens v. Bonding Ass'n of Kentucky, 538 S.W.2d, 580 (1976).
" See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 15-13-22 et seq. (Michie 1975); ALASKA STAT. §
9.65.030 (Michie 1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-734 to 43-747 (Bobbs-Merrill 1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-7-101 et seq. (Harrison 1978); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 804-10
(1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 42-2601 et seq. (Bobbs-Merrill 1977); IND. CODE ANN. §§
35-4-5-1 et seq. (Burns 1979) (extensive regulation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2806
(Weeks 1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 61B (Law. Co-op 1980); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 550.101 et seq. (West 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.67-.70 (West
1974); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 83-39-1 et seq. (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 544.580, 544.590
(Vernon 1974); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 697.010 and 178.504 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 598-A:1 (Equity 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-32-1 et seq. (West 1982) (ex-
tensive regulation); N.D. GEN. STAT. §§ 85C-1 et seq. (West 1976) (extensive
regulation); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1301 et seq. (West 1976); PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 5741 et seq. (Purdon 1979); S.C. CODE § 38-13-10 (Law. Co-op 1977); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 58-22-1 et seq. (1977) (extensive regulation); VA. CODE §
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obtaining and maintaining a license. The pragmatic problem of enforce-
ment, however, renders the regulatory method of bondsman control in-
effective and easily circumvented."
The ultimate solution obviously requires a direct or indirect elimina-
tion of the corporate surety from the bail process, as has been ad-
vocated by the American Bar Association since 1968.36 Such reform ax-
iomatically necessitates replacement of the surety system with an alter-
native system by which comparable appearance rates will be assured.
The two primary and "proven" pretrial release methods which have
been advocated as alternatives include release upon personal recog-
nizance (possibly attended by restrictive conditions), which has in many
jurisdictions become the presumed method of release, 3 and release
under a "ten percent deposit" system which bypasses the bondsman.
Under the latter method ten percent of the amount of an appearance
bond is deposited with the court and such is thereafter returned (or
ninety percent thereof) upon the performance of the conditions of
release.
The ten percent deposit system, where the court serves as the bonds-
man, benefits both the accused and the state.' The accused recovers
58-371.2 (Michie 1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 48.11.010 et seq (1980); W. VA.
CODE § 15-10-1 (West 1961).
11 Regulation, which was almost nonexistent twenty years ago, has been in-
creasingly promulgated by states and municipalities. See FREEDOM FOR SALE,
supra note 18, at 54; Murphy, State Control of the Operation of Professional Bail
Bondsmen, 36 U. CINN. L. REV. 375 (1967); Note, Bail Bondsmen: An Alternative,
6 SUFFOLK L. REV. 937, 945-52 (1972); see also Murphy, Revision of State Bail
Laws, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 451,454 (1971) (noting several states which have adopted the
Uniform Bail Bondsmen Licensing Act). For a discussion of the validity, construc-
tion and application of statutes regulating the bail bond business, see Annot., 13
A.L.R.3d 618-46 (1967).
36 See A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 64.
11 The bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146 et seq., makes release on
personal recognizance the presumptive form of bail in the federal forum. A
similar conclusion attaches to those states which have emulated the Bail Reform
Act of 1966, to wit: Alaska, Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
The success of release upon personal recognizance has been the subject of
several studies. See, e.g., Pettine, Trends in Own Recognizance Release: From
Manhattan to California, 5 PA. L.J. 675 (1974); Howard & Pettigrew, R.O.R. Pro-
gram in a University City, 58 A.B.A.J. 363 (1972); Hawthorne & McCully, Release
on Recognizance and the Dane County Bail Study, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 156; Wice
& Simon, Pretrial Release: A Survey of Alternative Practices, 34 FED. PROBA
TION 60 (1970); Note, Release on Recognizance: A Proven System, 18 LA. BAR. J.
183 (1970).
See generally Rice & Gallagher, An Alternative to Professional Bail Bond-
ing: A 10% Cash Deposit for Connecticut, 5 CONN. L. REV. 143 (1972); Conlin &
Meagher, The Percentage Deposit Bail System: An Alternative to the Profes-
sional Bondsman, 1 J. CRIM. JUST. 299 (1973). See also citations to authorities in
note 43 infra.
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part of the bail, which does not occur through utilization of a corporate
surety. As a result the initial acquisition of the necessary deposit
amount from friends or relatives who can be repaid is facilitated. Such
restriction further provides the accused with an incentive to appear for
future proceedings. Recovery renders the financial factor of pretrial
release less important and punitive, thereby eliminating to an extent
the inherently discriminatory effects that any financially founded
pretrial release process has upon the indigent accused and creates a
more equitable system which is ultimately in the state's best interest.39
Importantly, the ten percent system eliminates the corporate surety as
a cornerstone of the bail process and restores control of the bail system
to the judiciary with no detrimental effects to the accused or the
sovereign. The ten percent deposit system manifests an implementation
cost financially parallel to the corporate system."° Most importantly,
emperical studies conclusively demonstrate that the appearance rates
for individuals released upon a ten percent deposit bond and those
released upon a corporate surety bond do not substantially deviate.41
The benefits of the ten percent deposit system are intuitively obvious.
Illinois has utilized the ten percent deposit bail exclusive of corporate
bail since 1965 with undisputed and documented success.' The federal
39 The inherent inequities of a financially founded pretrial release system and
the rights of the indigent have proved to be major catalysts of the bail reform
movement. Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court has stated:
Further reflection has led me to conclude that no man should be denied
release because of indigence. Instead, under our constitutional system, a
man is entitled to be released on "personal recognizance" where other
relevant factors make it reasonable to believe that he will comply with
the orders of the Court.
Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 11, 13 (chamber opinion), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
852 (1961). This progressive philosophy was adopted and utilized by Congress
several years later through promulgation of the Bail Reform Act of 1966. See also
Ares & Sturz, Bail and the Indigent Accused, 8 CRIM. & DELINQ. 12 (1962); Lay,
Pretrial Release for Indigents in the U.S., 12 U. TASM. L. REV. 300 (1966);
Longedorf, Is Bail a Rich Man's Privilege?, 7 F.R.D. 309 (1947); Note, Bail: Condi-
tions of Pre-Trial Release for Indigent Defendants, 75 DICK. L. REV. 639 (1971);
Comment, Indigent Court Costs and Bail: Charge them to Equal Protection, 21
LA. L. REV. 627 (1961); Comment, Bail and the Indigent: Is There Equal Justice
Under the Law?, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 268 (1964); Comment, Institution of Bail as
Related to Indigent Defendants, 21 LA. L. REV. 627 (1961).
"0 See BAIL REFORM, supra note 3, at 195.
" See e.g., BAIL REFORM, supra note 3, at 194.
42 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-1 through § 110-17 (Smith-Hurd 1980), permits
a ten percent deposit bail exclusive of the corporate bail, ninety percent of which is
returned to the individual upon satisfying the conditions of the bond. The reten-
tion by the courts of ten percent of the bail to cover administrative costs was
determined to be constitutional in Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971), wherein
such practice was challenged (1) as violative of the Constitution of Illinois when
such assessment was maintained against a discharged defendant, and (2) as
violative of the United States Constitution as discriminatory against that class of
individuals which could not financially invoke a parallel statutory provision which
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government was second to initiate reform through promulgation of the
Bail Reform Act of 1966'" which greatly diminished, but did not
eliminate, the role of the corporate surety. The Act provides the judicial
officer with several options of pretrial release including parallel use of
both corporate and ten percent deposit bonds which has resulted in the
continued use of the commercial bondsman." The continued use of the
commercial bondsman may be due to the judicial officer's lack of
comparative analysis of the two systems; lack of knowledge of the in-
stitutional corruption and abusive practices attending the corporate
surety; reluctance to part with tradition; a laissez-faire attitude; a subjec-
tive conviction that appearance for trial is more likely assured when the
accused is subjected to a bondsman's supervision and/or authority of
surrender and arrest; or possibly a desire to totally prevent pretrial
release of a dangerous individual by requiring a corporate surety bond
which is unlikely to be secured. 5 Whatever the motivation may be, the
permitted the accused to deposit the full amount of the bond with the court and
thereafter receive 100% restitution. See also Smith & Reilley, The Illinois Bail
System: A Second Look, 6 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 33 (1972); Murphy, Revision
of State Bail Laws, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 472 (1972); Bowman, Illinois Ten Per
Cent Bail Deposit Provision, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 35; Boyle, Bail Under the Judicial
Article, 17 DE PAUL L. REV. 267, 272 (1968) (bail bondsman abruptly disappeared
in Illinois due primarily to the success of the ten percent deposit statute); Kamin,
Bail Administration in Illinois, 53 ILL. B.J. 674 (1965); Note, The Administration
of Illinois Bail Provisions: An Emperical Study of Four Downstate Illinois Coun-
ties, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 341.
43 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146, 3148-3149 (1969), incorporated in pertinent part into the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure through Rule 46(a) thereof. The "reform" in
the Bail Reform Act of 1966 consisted of the emphasis placed upon personal
recognizance as the presumptive method of release and the implementation of a
ten percent deposit bail alternative to the corporate bond. For further discussion
see Bogomolny & Sonnereich, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: Administrative Tail
Wagging and Other Legal Problems, 11 ARIZ. L. REV. 201 (1969); Wald & Freed,
The Bail Reform Act of 1966: A Practitioner's Primer, 52 A.B.A.J. 940 (1966);
Note, Bail Reform Act of 1966, 53 IOWA L. REV. 170 (1967); BAIL REFORM, supra
note 3, at 187.
" As shown in the Appendix, approximately twenty percent of the bonds re-
quired by the United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern
Division (which included Cleveland and Youngstown but not Akron, Ohio), during
1978, 1979 and 1980 were commercial bonds.
" Approximately two-thirds of the corporate surety bonds required in the
United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, during
the years 1978-1980, as noted in note 44 supra, were related to offenses involving
guns or physical violence (usually armed bank robbery). Bondsmen are under-
standably reluctant to become involved:
A guy that takes a gun and goes into a store or a bank must have it in
the back of his mind that he'll use it if he has to. Now if I bail him and
can't produce him in court, I've got to go get him. He didn't hesitate to
pull a gun when he held you up and I make a good target, big as I am.
Besides that the bonds in these cases run high, making the potential
losses greater. Taking someone who has gone to the gun just isn't worth
19811
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result is that the logical alternative to the bondsman, the ten percent
deposit, is often not utilized in the federal forum. Nevertheless, the Bail
Reform Act of 1966 is universally recognized as a milestone in bail
reform and has been emulated, along with its deficiencies, by several
states." For example, Oregon has totally eliminated the corporate surety
as a method of securing pretrial release;" and Kentucky has assumed
the ultimate reform posture of making the practice of issuing a cor-
porate bond a criminal offense." Unfortunately, however, the majority
of states have failed to implement reform with an objective of erad-
icating the corporate surety."
D. A Recapitulation
"The proper approach is to ask whether, in view of the known
abuses to which the business seems inevitably prone and its cor-
rupting influence on the criminal courts, the bondsman's limited
contribution to the system is worth preserving."'
Although the prominence of the professional bondsman has been sev-
erely restricted in many states and totally eradicated in a minority of
others, the corporate surety has, to a large extent, withstood the bail
reform movement of the past two decades. Those states which have re-
tained the corporate bond have largely failed to curtail the bondsman's
authority of arrest. The desirability of maintaining a bail system,
the risk. Besides a guy charged with that kind of offense knows he may
be going away for a long time and that increases the chances he'll skip.
FREEDOM FOR SALE, supra note 18, at 15. Accordingly, the federal judiciary may
prevent release of a potentially dangerous individual without violating the eighth
amendment's proscription against excessive bail by setting a corporate bond of
financially voluminous magnitude.
'6 See, e.g., note 111 infra.
Oregon permits pretrial release only through personal recognizance, super-
vised, or conditional release and ten percent deposit bond. See OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 134.255, 135.260 and 135.265 (1979) respectively. Therefore OR. REV. STAT. §
29.630, which permits the surety to arrest the principal, can be considered as
having been implicitly repealed. See also Snougger, An Article of Faith
Abolishes Bail in Oregon, 53 OR. L. REV. 273 (1974).
48 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.510 (Baldwin 1976). The Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky determined that this statutory reform did not constitute a taking of the
corporate surety's property without due process of law in deprivation of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution, noting that the provision
constituted a valid exercise of the police power and was justifiably promulgated
to promote public welfare. Stephens v. Bonding Ass'n of Kentucky, 538 S.W.2d
580 (1976).
41 Only Illinois, Oregon and Kentucky have eliminated the corporate bond as a
method of securing pretrial release. See notes 42, 47 and 48 supra respectively.
The bonding business has historically developed deep economic and political roots
which have too often transgressed legislatures' shallow attempts of bail reform.
See BAIL REFORM, supra note 3, at 184, noting that bondsmen strenuously opposed
Illinois bail reform without success.
50 8B J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 46-117 (3d ed. 1979).
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whereby the private bondsman can elude the constitutional due process
and fourth amendment restraints and extradition requirements of muni-
cipal and state law enforcement officers, is subject to serious scrutiny, if
not objectionable per se.
The perseverance of the bondsman requires examination of the var-
ious methods of legal redress which may be invoked by the abused prin-
cipal who is likely to continue as a victim of the corporate bail system.
The balance of this article addresses these legal remedies with em-
phasis on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
III. SOURCE AND SCOPE OF THE BONDSMAN'S AUTHORITY TO ARREST
The bondsman's authority to arrest and surrender the principal is
derived from three overlapping sources: (1) the contractual nature of the
undertaking between the surety and the principal, (2) the common law
principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Taintor,5" and
(3) statutory authorization. The parallel existence of these three sources
of authority and the inability of the judicial forum to concur in which
source is controlling (often failing to even distinguish among them), has
resulted in ambiguous, confused and contradictory decisions which ad-
dressed primarily the procedural and substantive authority of the bonds-
man. Importantly, the rights of the accused and the liability of the
surety deviate substantially depending upon which of the three sources
the court views as being the basis for the bondsman's authority.
A. The Contractual Undertaking
"[Flocus on the nature of bail as a merely private undertaking
ignores its reality as a method of securing the constitutional and
statutory right to bail."52
The surety-principal contract typically authorizes the surety, or an
agent thereof, to exercise jurisdiction and control over the principal
during the period for which the bond is executed. Additionally, the con-
tract authorizes the surety to arrest and surrender the principal at any
time in exoneration of the bondsman's pledge to the sovereign.' When
the agreement between the surety and the principal is viewed as strict-
ly contractual in nature, it follows that the perimeters of the
bondsman's conduct are derivative of (and limited only by) the terms of
the contract. These contracts are invariably drawn in an adhesive for-
mat and afford little protection to the principal as to be unconscionable.
Since the contract is private in nature, there is no "state action" per-
formed by the bondsman when arresting the principal pursuant to the
terms of the contract. Accordingly, the procedural and substantive con-
"' 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366 (1872).
5" Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb, 88 Mich. App. 519, 278 N.W.2d
653, 672 (1979).
' See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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stitutional restraints which attach to law enforcement agents in per-
forming arrests will not apply to the bondsman." Since the early 1800's
the contractual nature of the surety-principal relationship has served as
one primary focus of judicial examination wherein the perimeters of the
bondsman's authority were at issue.5' Both historical and more recent
decisions have concluded that the bail undertaking authorizes the
bondsman to arrest the principal without legal process or probable
cause, limit the principal's freedom of movement and transport the prin-
cipal across the state lines without extradition proceedings." Simply,
the private undertaking precludes application of constitutional stan-
dards, thereby creating in the bondsman powers which exceed those of
law enforcement officers. The virtually unlimited powers of the bonds-
man as derivative of the contractual relationship are perhaps best sum-
marized in the Fifth Circuit's oft-cited 1931 decision of Fitzpatrick v.
Williams:"
The right of the surety to recapture his principal is not a matter
of criminal procedure, but arises from the private undertaking
implied in the furnishing of the bond. In re Von Der Ahe [84 F.
959 (W.D. Pa. 1898)]. It is not a right of the state but of the surety.
If the state desires to reclaim a fugitive from its justice, in an-
other jurisdiction, it must proceed by way of extradition in de-
fault of a voluntary return. It cannot invoke the right of a surety
to seize and surrender his principal, for this is a private and not
a governmental remedy. It is equally true that the surety, if he
' Conduct of law enforcement officers as agents of the sovereign is "under
color of" law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (cited in full at note 7 supra)
and "state action" within the meaning of U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV. Law en-
forcement officers must confine their conduct within the bondaries of constitu-
tionally permissible standards as enunciated by the Supreme Court and as
derivative of the Constitution itself. Failure to do so exposes the law enforce-
ment officer to liability pursuant to actions founded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or, in
certain instances, directly under the United States Constitution. See generally
Crocker, When Cops are Robbers-Municipal Liability of Misconduct under
Section 1983 and Bivens, 15 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 295 (1981); Whitman, Constitu-
tional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1980); see also Leuchtman, Joint Liability in
Police Misconduct Cases, 60 MICH. Bus. J. (1981).
' Reese v. United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 13 (1869); Allied Fidelity Corp. v.
C.I.R., 572 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1978); Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d
547 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975); Hein v. United
States, 135 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1943); Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.
1931); In re Von Der Ahe, 85 F. 959 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898); Curtis v. Peerless Ins.
Co., 299 F. Supp. 429 (D. Minn. 1969); Thomas v. Miller, 282 F. Supp. 571 (E.D.
Tenn. 1968); Golla v. State, 50 Del. 495, 135 A.2d 137 (1957); Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7
Johns. 145 (N.Y. 1810).
" See Note, Bailbondsmen and the Fugitive Accused- The Need For Formal
Removal Procedures, 73 YALE L.J. 1098 (1964) (advocating extradition reform).
5' 46 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1931).
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has the right, is not required to resort to legal process to detain
his principal for the purpose of making surrender. * * * As long
as the principal remains within the jurisdiction, the right of bail
to arrest and surrender him without process is conceded. As
this right is a private one and not accomplished through govern-
mental procedure, there would seem to be no obstacle to its ex-
ercise wherever the surety finds the principal. Needing no pro-
cess, judicial or administrative, to seize his principal, jurisdic-
tion does not enter into the question. 8
Surprisingly, the surety-principal contract has rarely been challenged as
unconscionable, illegal, against public policy or as an adhesion contract. 9
It is myopic for the judiciary, in addressing the scope of the bonds-
man's authority of retrieval, to emphasize the contractual relationship
between the surety and the principal while simultaneously ignoring or
affording little importance to the existence of the sovereign as an active
party to the contract or as a third-party beneficiary thereto. The bond
undertaking is "essentially a tri-party agreement""0 between the surety,
the principal and the sovereign, and execution thereof is subject to the
condition precedent of the state's consent. Ostensibly, the state
authorizes the bondsman to engage in the business of being a private
jailer,"1 funded by fees paid by the principal and without cost to the
state, and thereby relieves itself of the financial expenses and legal
liabilities incurred in guarding and maintaining the principal as a
prisoner."e The sovereign, then, has a vested interest in the contract.
Id. at 40-41.
5' A contract which allowed the surety to surrender the principal and retain
the bond premium was challenged as "illegal" in Smith v. Rosenbaum, 333 F.
Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1972). A trial on the merits
was held before the court thereby implying that such a contract was valid. How-
ever, no contract principles were discussed thereby rendering this "contract"
decision of negligible precedent.
Since the surety-principal contract implicitly authorizes the bondsman to
utilize force if necessary, and thereby commit a tort upon the principal, such
may be illegal as against public policy. See generally RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 512 (1932) ("[A] bargain is illegal ... if either its formation or its per-
formance is criminal, tortious, or otherwise opposed to public policy."); J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 22-1 (2d ed. 1977).
0 Allied Fidelity Corp. v. C.I.R., 572 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 835 (1978) (bail bond contracts for federal income tax purposes are not
contracts of insurance).
1 As the Supreme Court has appropriately noted: "When a prisoner is out of
bond he is still under court control, though the bounds of his confinement are
enlarged. His bondsmen are his jailers." Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 547
(1952).
"2 See Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 557 (9th Cir. 1974) (en
banc) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975). See also Dill,
Discretion Exchange and Social Control: Bail Bondsmen in Criminal Courts, 9
LAW AND Soc. REV. 639 (1975).
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In addressing the perimeters of the bondsman's authority of retrieval,
the proper judicial focus should be on the contract between the surety
and the sovereign wherein the surety promises to provide what is
essentially a police service, 3 that of the retrieval of the principal in the
event of nonappearance at trial. Judicial focus on this aspect of the tri-
party agreement permits a piercing of the principal-surety contract veil
and also allows judicial examination of the ultimate result of this tri-
party agreement, to wit, creation by the sovereign of a class of private
individuals who serve as jailers and police. The sovereign constructively
coerces the principal into waiving constitutional rights by mandating
the posting of a corporate surety bond (wherein the waiver occurs) as a
prerequisite to pretrial release. The state simultaneously executes a
contract with the bondsman whereby the latter effectively becomes a
quasi-agent of the state with police power to arrest the principal
through the state's acknowledgement and approval of the surety-
principal contract."4
The end result is that the state authorizes that which it could not do
itself, namely, retrieval of the principal without application of constitu-
tional standards. Accordingly, judicial focus on the contractual relation-
ship between the principal and the surety, while ignoring the role of the
state, constitutes a narrow and overly restrictive examination of a
broad problem. Such focus also fails to address the pertinent issue of
3 Although the surety-sovereign contract requires the bondsman to forfeit
the face amount of the bond in the event that the principal is not produced for
trial, such contract is essentially for a service rather than finance oriented:
Yet, as is obvious, the state can only be whole by the recapture of the ac-
cused and the resulting vindication of the rights of society. For it is
society that the criminal process protects and the payment of a sum by
[the surety] does not satisfy that interest until the state regains the
ability to punish those who break the law. [The surety's] principal obliga-
tion is to produce the accused at trial. The monetary obligation is merely
an assurance of, or inducement to perform that principal obligation.
[Citation omitted.] [The surety's] contract thus resembles more a con-
tract to perform services than a contract of insurance. The forfeiture of
the surety's bond, if the accused fails to appear, is not to reimburse the
state for an economic loss but serves more as a penalty for the surety's
own failure to perform.
Allied Fidelity Corp. v. C.I.R., 572 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
835 (1978).
" The Supreme Court has noted that not only does the sovereign
acknowledge the contract between the surety and the principal, but it also
refuses to interfere with it: "There is also an implied covenant on the part of the
government, when the recognizance of bail is accepted, that it will not in any way
interfere with this covenant between them, or impair its obligation .. " Reese v.
United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 13, 22 (1869). The ultimate result of this posture
is demonstrated in Dunkin v. Lamb, 500 F. Supp. 184 (D. Nev. 1980), where police
refused to intervene on the principal's behalf while he was being arrested with
excessive force by the bondsman.
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whether a state may contractually appoint private individuals to fulfill
those duties which have been traditionally reserved to law enforcement
officers and allow those private individuals to circumvent constitutional
restrictions. Form is honored by this process, while substance is ig-
nored."
B. The Common Law
"The seemingly absolute powers granted the bondsmen at
common law are not without restriction and must be interpreted
in light of modern common law and constitutional principles.""
The 1872 Supreme Court decision of Taylor v. Taintor7 enunciated
what has since become universally recognized as the common law rights
of the bondsman:
When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the
custody of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the
original imprisonment. Whenever they choose to do so, they
may seize him and deliver him up in their discharge; and if that
cannot be done at once, they may imprison him until it can be
done. They may exercise their rights in person or by agent.
They may pursue him into another State; may arrest him on the
Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and enter his house for
that purpose. The seizure is not made by virtue of new process.
None is needed. It is likened to the re-arrest by the sheriff of an
escaping prisoner .... [I]t is said: "The bail have their principal
on a string, and may pull the string whenever they please, and
render him in their discharge.''" 8
The contractual nature of the bond undertaking, as discussed
heretofore, must be considered as having constituted an important
founding axiom upon which the common law scope of authority was
premised since previous decisions, which emphasized such contractual
65 As has been aptly noted:
The argument that bondsmen act as private agents and that their arrest
and detention powers are based exclusively on a bail contract with the
defendant, honors form and ignores substance. The bondsmen occupy an
essential role in the criminal process of most states and their activities
intertwine with the state interest in pre-trial release and appearance of
defendants. In the arrest and return of a fugitive defendant the bonds-
man operates as a de facto agent of the state in that the purpose of his
pursuit, the arrest and transportation of the defendant, is identical to the
goal of state police officers involved in retrieval of fugitive defendants
or interstate retrieval through extradition procedures.
Murphy, Revision of State Bail Laws, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 466 (1971).
Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794, 802 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
67 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366 (1872).
68 Id. at 371-72.
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nature, were cited with approval by Taylor.69 Taylor, however, more
pertinently emphasized that the enormous responsibility placed upon
the bondsman, i.e., assuming custody of the accused and assuring his ap-
pearance, justified the bondsman's broad power. °
The virtually unlimited powers of the surety as enunciated in Taylor
have not been relegated to antiquity and are often contemporarily con-
strued as delineating the standards of permissible surety conduct.7'
Since Taylor, the Supreme Court has failed to subsequently address or
curtail the rights of the surety despite having had the opportunity to do
so." Although the powers of the bondsman are inherently repulsive to
the class of fourth and fourteenth amendment Supreme Court decisions
which carefully restricted the rights of law enforcement personnel act-
ing under color of law in situations involving search and seizure, the
principles of Taylor cannot be considered as having been overruled and
repudiated sub silentio by such constitutional decisions unless it is first
determined that the activity of the surety is tantamount to "state ac-
tion," a prerequisite to the invocation of constitutional principles.73
69 Cited with approval is Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns 145 (N.Y. 1810) (the
power of the bail does not depend upon any process, but results from the nature
of the undertaking, and it is not affected by the jurisdiction of the court or of the
state).
Also cited with approval is Commonwealth v. Brickett, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 138
(1829), wherein the court held that a bondsman may arrest the principal outside
of the state's jurisdiction, noting: "It is contended that the liability does not arise
from the contract. We think it does .. " Id at 141. It was further summarized:
By the common law the bail was the custody of the principal, and may
take him at any time, and in any place .... The taking is not considered
as the service of process, but as a continuation of the custody which has
been, at the request of the principal, committed to the bail. The principal
may therefore be taken on Sunday. The dwellinghouse is no longer the
castle of the principal, in which he may place himself to keep off the bail.
If the door should not be opened on demand at midnight, the bail may
break it down, and take the principal from his bed, if that measure
should be necessary to enable the bail to take the principal.
Id. at 140. The "midnight/bedroom" arrests authorized by Brickett have been ex-
ecuted. See United States v. Trunko, 189 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Ark. 1960), where
armed bondsmen entered the bedroom of the principal where his wife and infant
child were also sleeping, handcuffed the principal, and drove away "at a high rate
of speed" leaving the shocked wife "considerably excited about her husband's ar-
rest." Id. at 561.
70 See Allied Fidelity Corp. v. C.I.R., 572 F.2d 1190, 1192-93 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978); Smith v. Rosenbaum, 333 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
Curtis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 229 F. Supp. 429 (D. Minn. 1969).
71 See Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U.S. 64 (1899); Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. 704
(1834); United States v. Goodwin, 440 F.2d 1152, 1156 (3d Cir. 1971).
72 Certiorari was denied in Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547 (9th
Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975), an action wherein the Ninth
Circuit considered en banc the state action issue.
" Constitutional limitations do not attach to private conduct "no matter how
wrongful." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948).
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Whether a nexus exists between the surety and the sovereign sufficient
to transform the private conduct of the bondsman into the action of the
state so as to attach to the surety the constitutional limitations appli-
cable to the sovereign, however, is an issue the Supreme Court has not
addressed.
Contradictory judicial pronouncements have issued from both federal
and state forums wherein "state action" has been addressed." Where no
state action is judicially found, and in the absence of statutory abroga-
tion or modification of the common law,"5 it is typically determined that
Taylor provides both the source and scope of the bondsman's authority
of retrieval."8 Further, when an abused principal attempts to secure
redress in the state forum by initiating an action in tort such as false im-
prisonment, trespass or assault and battery, no "state action" will be
pleaded since that is not an element of the tort. Thus, the tribunal will
necessarily be constrained to apply the common law principles of Taylor
in the absence of statutory modification.
The contractual nature of the bond undertaking, implicitly authoriz-
ing the use of reasonable force and permitting the surety to break and
enter to effectuate an arrest, together with the explicit enunciations of
Taylor, have proved to be major barriers to tort recovery. 7 In sum,
Taylor is dispositive of the scope of the surety's authority except where
state action is found to exist (in which instance the principal is pro-
tected, at least to an extent, by the Constitution) or the common law has
been statutorily abrogated or modified.
When Taylor is viewed as the source of the bondsman's authority and
power over the principal the pertinent issue becomes the scope of such
power. In short, Taylor authorizes the surety to:
(1) continue custody over the principal,
(2) seize the principal without process,
(3) imprison the principal until the latter may be surrendered
into the custody of the state,
(4) utilize agents,
(5) pursue the principal into another state, and
(6) break and enter the principal's dwelling.
Although "the principal is regarded as delivered to the custody of his
sureties"" such custody does not authorize the bondsman to shackle,
" The following cases have determined that the conduct of the bondsman con-
stituted "state action." Citizens for Pre-trial Justice v. Goldfarb, 88 Mich. App.
519, 278 N.W.2d 653 (1979); see Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1970). In
contrast, many such cases found no state action. See, e.g., Ouzts v. Nat'l Ins. Co.,
505 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975); Thomas v.
Miller, 282 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
7 See notes 110-25 infra and accompanying text.
76 See citations in note 74 supra.
77 See, e.g., State v. Lingerfelt, 109 N.C. 755, 14 S.E. 75 (1891).
7' Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1872).
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confine or impede the principal's daily movements."9 Rather, the accused
remains on the bondsman's "string.""
The outer boundaries of force which may be utilized by the surety are
currently undefined. Although it has been noted that an arrest may only
be effectuated through utilization of such force as is reasonably
necesssary,81 in State v. Lingerfelt8" the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, interpreting, Taylor, indicated that a bondsman may justifiably
kill a principal who resists arrest as long as the principal was informed
of the surety's authority and makes no objection thereto. The issue of
whether the bondsman may justifiably utilize deadly force to arrest a
principal when the underlying bailable offense is a misdemeanor has not
been judicially addressed. 3 Similarly unresolved is the tangential issue
of whether a bondsman may respond with deadly force in a public area
when the principal resists with deadly force, and the bondsman's
response is not necessary for purposes of self-defense but is reasonably
necessary for the ultimate apprehension. It is posited that the public
policy of promoting the the tranquility, safety and welfare of the prin-
cipal, the bondsman and the community, significantly outweighs the
public policy of assuring the appearance of the accused at trial. 4 Since
the bondsman need not retreat when arrest is resisted and a principal
may be reluctant to retreat if apprehension is attempted in his home, a
classic confrontation is manifested, particularly if the principal is uncer-
tain of the identity or intentions of the nonuniformed persons attemp-
" McCaleb v. Peerless Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 512 (D. Neb. 1965) (principal
handcuffed and controlled for eighty hours with no attempt to surrender same to
the sovereign).
80 Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1872); Ruggles v. Corey, 3
Conn. 419, 421 (Conn. 1820).
81 Reese v. United States, 76 U.S. (16 Wall.) 13 (1869); Maynard v. Kear, 474 F.
Supp. 794, 802 (N.D. Ohio 1979) ("reasonable or necessary force"); Smith v. Rosen-
baum, 333 F. Supp. 35, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (bondsman may implement "reasonable
means needed to effect the apprehension"), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1972).
82 109 N.C. 755, 14 S.E. 75 (N.C. 1891).
3 The underlying bailable offense in Lingerfelt was murder. It is typically
statutorily impermissible for a law officer to utilize deadly force to arrest an in-
dividual when the underlying offense is a misdemeanor. See generally Annot., 83
A.L.R.3d 174 (1978) (right of peace officer to use deadly force in attempting to ar-
rest fleeing felon); Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 238 (1978) (peace officer's civil liability for
death or personal injuries caused by intentional force in arresting
misdemeanant). Note that corporate bonds can be required for misdemeanor
violations. Maryland v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (misdemeanor
traffic offense).
In support of the proposition that such public exchanges of weapon fire occur,
see The Plain Dealer, Jan. 1, 1982, at 10-A, col. 1-2 (bondsman shot by police
responding to incident involving arrest wherein principal was fired upon by bond-
sman while attempting escape down a public street).
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ting seizure. Understandably the amount of force which may be "nec-
essary" to effectuate such retrieval may be considerable.
An arrest may be instituted without the issuance of process85 since
the contract effectively serves as the authority to arrest." Although
Taylor authorizes the surety to "break and enter [the principal's] house"
to effectuate arrest, and further analogizes such seizure to "the rearrest
by the sheriff of an escaping prisoner,"87 common law decisions before
and after Taylor have recognized that the surety must first announce
his identity, reveal his intentions and demand peaceful surrender prior
to utilizing forceful measures.8 The bondsman's failure to satisfy these
criteria may justify a self defense killing of the surety as demonstrated
in Shine v. State."9
Little authority exists which addresses the issue of whether the bonds-
man may break and enter the dwelling of a third party to sieze a prin-
cipal located therein. In Livingston v. Browder" the Court of Civil Ap-
peals of Alabama, noting that Taylor "analogized the power of a bail
bondsman to arrest his principal to the power of a sheriff to rearrest an
escaping prisoner,""g  consulted contemporary statutory and constitu-
tional law to determine the permissible perimeters of entry attending
such an arrest by a law enforcement officer. Since the sources consulted
indicated that the sanctity of a third party dwelling may be breached if
the officer's authority and purpose are announced and reasonable means
of entry utilized, the same criteria were held applicable to the bonds-
man. The disturbing result of Livingston is that it gives the bondsman
authority to arrest the principal wherever the latter may be found, may
represent an impermissible extension of the Taylor "escaping prisoner"
analogy.
In fairness to Livingston, it is noted that Taylor cited with approval
Blackstone's commentaries wherein the following is provided: "[11f the
[defendant] be in the house of another, the bailiff or sheriff may break
and enter it to effect his purpose, but he ought to be very certain that
the defendant be, at the time of such forcible entry, in the house."92
Perhaps such statement and authority were envisioned by Taylor as
applicable to the bondsman. However, an examination of the two axioms
which define the rights of the bondsman in Taylor, namely the contrac-
tual nature of the undertaking and the necessity of providing the surety
" 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1872).
N Id.; Livingston v. Browder, 51 Ala. App. 366, 285 So. 2d 927, 930 (1973).
87 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1872).
See Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822); Poteete v. Olive, 527 S.W.2d 84 (Tenn.
1975).
89 44 Ala. App. 171, 204 So. 2d 817 (1967).
51 Ala. App. 366, 285 So. 2d 923 (1973).
Id. at 369, 285 So. 2d at 926.
92 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 289, note 31.
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with broad authority to effectuate the responsibility assumed, leads to
an opposite conclusion.
Livingston specifically observed that "the right of a surety to capture
his principal is not a matter of criminal procedure, but arises from
private rights established by the bail contract between the principal
and his surety."93 If the rights and liabilities of the surety are viewed as
derivative of the contractual nature of the undertaking, it follows that
the dwelling of a noncontracting party may not be forcefully entered
regardless of the terms of such contract. This conclusion is reasonable
as neither the principal, the surety, nor the sovereign possess the
authority to offer or accept such a condition as consideration or to
authorize an illegal trespass. 4 Further, the public policy of assuring the
appearance of the accused for judicial proceedings, through arrest by
the surety or otherwise, is heavily outweighed by the contravening
public policy of honoring the sanctity of the dwellings of innocent third
parties from unreasonable searches and preventing potentially violent
confrontations therein. The scope of protection afforded the dwelling
owner from unreasonable intrusions is evidenced in the class of fourth
and fourteenth amendment Supreme Court decisions which have severely
restricted the permissible conduct of law enforcement officers; for ex-
ample, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, which excludes
evidence in a criminal proceeding when the evidence is obtained in con-
travention of the fourth or fourteenth amendments, is premised upon
the recognition that deterring law enforcement officers from violating
the sanctity of the dwelling and the individuals therein outweighs the
need of society to prosecute criminals. 5 The principal is less than a
criminal during the period in which the bond is in effect, and has merely
been accused of committing some offense. Simply, the propriety of Liv-
ingston, wherein the principal-surety battleground has been extended to
any dwelling where the principal may be located, is subject to serious
issue.
The principal must be arrested for the sole purpose of surrendering
him to the custody of the sovereign.9" Accordingly, in McCaleb v. Peer-
9 51 Ala. App. at 369, 285 So. 2d at 930.
See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1977).
9 See generally 29 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence §§ 411-427 (1967); Annot., 43
A.L.R.2d 385 (1972) (discussion of fruit of poisonous tree doctrine as excluding
evidence derived from information gained by illegal search); Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d
959 (1962) (federal Constitution as affecting admissibility of evidence obtained by
illegal search and seizure); Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956) (rule governing ad-
missibility of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure).
" "Whenever [the sureties] choose to do so, they may seize [the principal] and
deliver him up in their discharge; and if that cannot be done at once, they may
imprison him until it can be done." Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371
(1872) (emphasis added). Cf. Shine v. State, 44 Ala. App. 171, 204 So. 2d 817 (1967)
(Bondsmen may lawfully arrest and turn a principal over to the sheriff only when
a bondsman owes an obligation to the court.).
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less Insurance Company,97 the boundaries of permissible conduct were
clearly exceeded and damages for false imprisonment were assessed
when the principal was shackled and controlled for approximately
eighty hours without being surrendered into custody."
The surety's common law authority of interstate retrieval is univer-
sally recognized and arises from the contractual nature of the undertaking
which transcends the jurisdictional boundaries of the sovereign." No
judicial proceeding is conducted to ascertain the identity of the prin-
cipal, the authority of the surety, or the continuing pendency of the
underlying offense for which bond was originally required."' This
authority of the surety is sharply contrasted with that of state law en-
forcement officers who must comply with extradition requirements1 '
and federal law officers who must satisfy the hearing requirements of
Rule 40, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, when the individual is to
be transported in excess of one hundred miles.0 2
The foregoing demonstrates that the authority of the surety exceeds
that of law enforcement personnel. The following justification is typically
offered:
:7 250 F. Supp. 512 (D. Neb. 1965).
9' The Court noted
It]hat whenever a bondsman takes undue advantage of his justly granted
and needed authority in violation of his duty to the granting court and
such undue advantage results in injury or damage to his principal or
another party, that bondsman should and will be rendered liable for any
damage caused as a result of an act or acts which would render liable
any other person who was not vested with such authority.
Id. at 515.
" In support of the proposition that such authority is customarily utilized see
Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1931) (Louisiana to Washington);
Thomas v. Miller, 282 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1968) (Ohio to Tennessee); In re
Von Der Abe, 85 F. 959 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898) (Missouri to Pennsylvania).
That such authority is derivative of the contract, see text accompanying note
58 supra. Accord, United States v. Goodwin, 440 F.2d 1152 (ed Cir. 1971), wherein
it was stated: "A bondsman has the right to pursue his principal into a state
other than the one where the bond was executed and arrest him for the purpose
of returning him to the state from which he fled." Id. at 156.
10 The absence of procedural safeguards has been justifiably criticized. See
Murphy, Revision of State Bail Laws, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 462-69 (1971); Note,
Bailbondsmen and the Fugitive Accused- The Need For Formal Removal Pro-
cedures, 73 YALE L.J. 1098 (1964) (exclusively addressing and advocating reform
in the area of interstate bondsman retrieval).
101 The vast majority of states have adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act, 11 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT. 59 (1967). See Murphy, supra note 100, at 465 n.90;
Note, Illegal Abductions by State Police: Sanctions for Evasion of Extradition
Statutes, 61 YALE L.J. 445 (1952); Annot., 90 A.L.R. 3d 1085 (1979) (necessity that
demanding state show probable cause to arrest fugitive in extradition pro-
ceedings); Annot., 45 A.L.R. FED. 871 (1971) (arrest and transportation of fugitive
without extradition proceedings as violative of civil rights actionable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
10 For further discussion see Murphy, supra note 100, at 463-64; 8A J. MOORE,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICES 40.01-40.04 (2d ed. 1980).
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There is a strong public policy in preventing the principal from
"jumping bond" and because of this, the surety is permitted a
large discretion as to the steps necessary to effect the apprehen-
sion of the principal. Clearly, this large amount of authority
allowed the surety is justified by the responsibility imposed
upon him. °3
It is posited that the public policy of assuring the appearance of the ac-
cused at trial is outweighed by the public policy of assuring continued
constitutional protection to an individual released prior to trial."0 4 Since
the principal will not attempt "escape" while in the presence of the surety,
but will instead quietly disappear once direct surety supervision is
relaxed, it appears to be more appropriate to empower the bondsman
with no more authority than a law officer who seeks to apprehend an
"escaped" prisoner rather than an "escaping" prisoner. The principal
and third parties would then be protected by the "search and seizure"
standards of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. An individual
released by the sovereign should certainly possess no less of a constitu-
tional status than does an escaped criminal. Since an individual con-
victed of a criminal offense may not be retrieved by private bounty
hunters acting in circumvention of the Constitution, it is improvident to
perpetuate a system of pretrial release wherein bounty hunters may
be utilized to retrieve an individual merely accused of an offense simply
because such individual has been coerced into a contractual relationship
authorizing such retrieval as a condition precedent to exercising the
fundamental right to bail.
1
1
5
It is appropriate to analogize the fifth and fourteenth amendment due
process liberty interest, 6 which should be afforded to the accused, to
that interest possessed by an individual released on parole or probation,
since all three are effectively released from custody upon terms which
are established by the sovereign. The Supreme Court decision of Mor-
rissey v. Brewer"7 firmly established that "the liberty interest of a
parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of un-
qualified liberty,"'0 8 that such valuable liberty interest is within the pro-
tective ambit of the fourteenth amendment, and that a deprivation of
103 Livingston v. Browder, 51 Ala. App. 366, 285 So. 2d 923, 925 (1973).
"u To the same effect: "It is my determination, therefore, that the liberty in-
terest of a person released on bail significantly outweighs the state's interest in
the current alternative arrest method provided to professional bondsmen."
Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb, 278 N.W.2d 652-72 (Mich. App. 1979).
1" That bail is a fundamental right, see Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("excessive bail shall not be required").
"s Invocation of the fifth or fourteenth amendments' due process clauses
necessitates demonstration of an appropriate "liberty or property" interest. Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
101 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
' Id. at 484.
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such liberty may not occur without a hearing."9 Thus, the bondsman
should not possess the authority to summarily apprehend the principal
before the trial without demonstrating to the judiciary that the prin-
cipal intends to escape or has violated a condition of the contractual
undertaking, particularly since the principal has provided monetary con-
sideration for such freedom.
Statutory modifications of the common law principles enunciated in
Taylor must be applauded to the extent that they exist. Only Illinois,
Oregon and Kentucky have directly eliminated commercial bail as a
method of securing pretrial release."' Several states have emulated the
Bail Reform Act of 1966, wherein the option of requiring corporate or
ten percent bail is presented to the judicial officer, thereby creating an
opportunity to indirectly eliminate the commercial bail through ex-
clusive use of ten percent bail."' The limited studies which exist in-
dicate that such indirect elimination has failed to materialize. 2
Due process standards have been implemented in various forms.
Connecticut has delegated the authority to arrest the principal to the
exclusive jurisdiction of law enforcement personnel and requires, as a
condition precedent to such arrest, that the surety verify under oath
that the principal intends to escape."3 The Texas surety may effectuate
seizure only after obtaining a warrant of arrest from the judiciary. 4
Several other states require the bondsman to obtain a certified copy of
the bond undertaking from the judiciary, which thereafter serves as
process."' A large number of states permit arrest by agents of the
bondsman only if they are of suitable age"6 and have obtained written
authority endorsed on a certified copy of the bond."' Failure to comply
Id. See also Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 306 (1972) (right to assistance of counsel at
proceedings to revoke probation).
"' See notes 42-49 supra and accompanying text.
"'. See AIASKA STAT § 12.30.020 (1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 811.3 (West Supp.
1977).
"' See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
"1 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-65, 52-319 (West 1978). Although Minnesota
permits the surety to effectuate a seizure only upon the belief "that his principal
is about to abscond, or that he will not appear as required by his recognizance, or
not otherwise perform the conditions thereof," such standard is subjective and
does not require a hearing to determine the validity of the surety's belief and, ac-
cordingly, offers no due process safeguards. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 269.63 (West
1947).
"I TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 17.19 (Vernon 1977).
115 ALA. CODE § 15-13-62 (1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.600 (Vernon 1949); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-1227 (1945).
.. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2713.22 (Page 1981).
"I ALA. CODE § 15-13-02 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-717 (1977); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1301 (West 1969); IDAHO CODE § 19-2925 (1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.600
(Vernon 1949); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-9-205 (1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2713.22
(Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1107 (West 1951); TENN. CODE ANN.
1981]
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with these conditions will render the arrest illegal."8
California prohibits out-of-state bondsmen from arresting principals
who are seeking refuge therein."' The foreign bondsman must demon-
strate probable cause for arrest before a county magistrate. After prob-
able cause is shown, the magistrate will issue a warrant for the prin-
cipal's arrest to an officer of the court. A hearing is then conducted at
which time the principal is afforded the right to counsel and is sur-
rendered to the custody of the surety for return to the issuing jurisdic-
tion only if "the magistrate is satisfied from the evidence that the person
is a fugitive.""12 Although failure by the bondsman to utilize these pro-
cedural methods renders such a seizure a misdemeanor,"' the bondsman
can typically be expected to circumvent attempts of prosecution by
returning to the originating jurisdiction and thereby avoiding service of
process.' California's attempts at requiring due process hearings pre-
sent, however, an obvious financial burden and can be expected to be
utilized by fugitive principals as a dilatory tactic. Conspicuously absent
are similar due process restraints upon California bondsman who may
arrest both inside and outside California without a hearing, although
they are subject to the requirement that the principal must be sur-
rendered into the custody of the sovereign within forty-eight hours
after apprehension.'
Alabama, Nevada, Tennessee, Missouri and Oklahoma statutorily
authorize the bondsman to arrest the principal only within the jurisdic-
tion of the state.'24 Many states have attempted to discourage private
retrieval by enabling the bondsman to employ law enforcement person-
nel to effectuate arrest. 5
§ 40-1227 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-43-23 (1953); VA. CODE § 19.2-149 (1950);
WISC. STAT. ANN. § 818.21 (West 1976).
"' See Nicholson v. Killpatrick, 188 Ala. 258, 66 So. 8 (1914); Gray v.
Strickland, 163 Ala. 344, 50 So. 152 (1909); Cooke v. Harper, 78 Ind. App. 267, 135
N.E. 349 (1922).
".. CAL. PENAL CODE § 847.5 (West 1970), discussed in Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l
Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975).
12' CAL. PENAL CODE § 847.5 (West 1969).
121 1&
" This senario is demonstrated in Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d
547 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975).
'2 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1301 (West 1969) (surrender within forty-eight hours).
For futher discussion and criticism of CAL. PENAL CODE § 847.5 as "one-way," see
Note, California Bail System, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1134 (1968).
".. ALA. CODE § 15-13-63 (1965); Mo. ANN STAT. § 544.600 (Vernon 1949); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 178.526 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1107 (West 1951); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-1227 (1955).
"' See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.22 (West 1972); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.913
(1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.23 (West 1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-5-29 (1972);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1107 (West 1951); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1228 (1955);
VA. CODE § 19.2-149 (1950); W. VA. CODE § 62-1C-14 (1977).
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C. Statutory Authorization
"Statutory authorization to arrest vests in bondsmen 'the
coercive power of the State.' "126
The bondsman's source of authority to arrest the principal may be
viewed as derived from the contractual nature of the undertaking, the
common law principles enunciated in Taylor v. Tainter or as provided
by statute. Virtually every state which has retained the corporate sure-
ty as a cornerstone of the bail process has enacted a statute substantial-
ly similar to Ohio Revised Code section 2713.22 which provides in full:
For the purpose of surrendering the defendant, the bail may ar-
rest him at any time or place before he is finally charged, or, by
a written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the bond,
may empower any person of suitable age and discretion to do
SO.127
These statutes fail to establish express procedural or substantive stan-
dards that the bondsman must satisfy when performing the apprehen-
sion authorized by this statute. It is, however, common for the enacting
state to statutorily delineate standards attending a similar arrest by a
law enforcement officer. 12 '8 The issue, therefore, arises as to the per-
missible scope of surety conduct when a state statute is relied upon as
authorization for the seizure.
26 Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547. 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975) (Hufstedler, Browning, Duniway and Ely, JJ.,
dissenting).
127 OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 2713.22 (Page 1981). See generally ALA. CODE
§ 14-13-62 (1975); ALASKA CRIM. CODE § 41(h) (1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-3885 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-717, 43-718, 34-628 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1301 (West 1969); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-108(c) (1978); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM.
RI 46(g); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 903.22, 903.29 (West 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 27.904
(1978); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 709-14 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 19-2925 (1978); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-4-5-7 (Burns 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 811.8(3) (West 1977); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-2809 (1974); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. § 340 (West 1967); ME. CODE
CRIM. PRO. Rule 46(F); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, §§ 58-59 (Michie/Law. Co-op
1979); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.913 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.91 (West 1947);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-5-27 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.600 (Vernon 1949); MONT.
REV. CODE ANN. § 46-9-205 (1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29.906 (1979); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 178.526 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.27-59z28 (1974); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-3-3 (1978); N.Y. STAT. ANN. § 530.30(2) (1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1107 (West 1951); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-13-19; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
23A-43-29 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1277 (1955); TEX. CRIM. CODE ANN. art.
17.19 (Vernon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-43-23 (1953); VA. CODE § 19-2-149
(1950); W. VA. CODE § 62-1C-14 (1977); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 818.21 (West 1976); WYO.
STAT. §§ 7-110-113 and 7-110-114 (1980).
128 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2933.01-.58 (Page 1981) (search warrants),
and §§ 2935.01-.33 (Page 1981) (arrest). Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 765.26
(1967) (bondsman may summarily arrest principal) with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 600.6075-.6078 (1967) (procedural safeguards attending civil arrest).
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A statutory provision expressly creates a condition precedent to ar-
rest which is not mandated by common law, such as obtaining a certified
copy of the bond, a bail piece or an arrest warrant. It is settled that such
a condition is not cumulative to, but exclusive of, the common law, and
failure to satisfy that requirement will render the seizure illegal.'29
The more difficult issue is what are the permissible perimeters of
surety conduct when the statute, which is considered as the source of
such authority, does not modify common law principles. The outer boun-
daries of conduct will then be dependent upon classifying the arrest as
"state action" or "private action." If classified as "state action," con-
stitutional and statutory limitations which apply to the sovereign will
attach to the surety. If classified as "private action," the statute will be
viewed as merely cumulative and declaratory of the common law. 3 '
Although at least nine states enacted general "arrest statutes" prior to
the 1872 Taylor decision, this does not foreclose the conclusion that
these statutes may be declaratory of the common law which existed at
the state and lower federal court level as early as 1810."'
State statutes are often deemed to incorporate common law powers.
The general arrest statute of Minnesota has been held to "essentially...
codify the common law" and Taylor was judicially consulted as deter-
mining the scope of permissive authority."'2 The virtue of considering
common law principles as incorporated into general arrest statutory
129 See Cooke v. Harper, 78 Ind. App. 267, 135 N.E. 349 (1922) (construing In-
diana statute). Compare In re Von Der Abe, 85 F. 959 (W.D. Pa. 1898) (noting that
a "bail piece" which the bondsman was required to obtain by a Pennsylvania
statute was simply evidence of the relationship between the parties and that the
right to arrest is derivative of the contract) with Smith v. Rosenbaum, 333 F.
Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1972) ("bail piece" created
state action), and Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1970) ("bail piece" created
state action). Compare Poteete v. Olive, 527 S.W.2d 84 (Tenn. 1975) (holding
Tennessee statute which required certified copy of the bond as a prerequisite to
arrest to be exclusive of the common law) with Thomas v. Miller, 282 F. Supp.
571 (E.D. Tenn. 1968). See Austin v. State, 541 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
(Texas statutory requirement of arrest warrant exclusive of common law); see
also Gray v. Strickland, 163 Ala. 344, 50 So. 152 (1909) (Alabama statute requiring
certified copy of the undertaking exclusive of common law).
130 See citations in note 74 supra.
131 The following "arrest statutes" are identical or similar to statutes pro-
mulgated in the year which accompanies each citation: ALA. CODE § 15-13-62
(1977) (1852); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1301 (West 1970) (1872); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 804.14 (1976) (1869); IOWA CODE ANN. § 811.8 (1950) (1843); MICH. COMP. LAWS.
ANN. § 765.26 (1967) (1840); PA. R. CRIM. P. § 4016A(3), 42 PA. CONN. STAT. ANN.
(1981) (1860); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1227 (1975) (1827); W. VA. CODE § 62-1C-14
(1966) (1852).
The common law preceded even these statutes; see Read v. Case, 4 Conn, 166
(1822); Nicholls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145 (N.Y. 1810).
132 See Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 552 (9th Cir. 1974) (en
banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975) ("The statute codifies the bondsman's com-
mon law right to arrest.").
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provisions, is that only one scope of permissible conduct will exist: the
common law. Thus, the judiciary will be relieved of the necessity of
determining whether the surety subjectively considered the apprehen-
sion of the principal as authorized by common law or by a parallel
statute.' Consistency and predictability in judicial proceedings will be
promoted. Unfortunately, the virtue of such incorporation ends here.
The reported decisions of the federal and state forums are con-
spicuously devoid of litigation wherein the constitutionality of arrest
statutes is challenged, even though many of these statutes were pro-
mulgated as early as the 1800's and appear to be constitutionally
suspect. Many of these statutes have been recodified or slightly
modified since their enactment.'34 A maxim of statutory construction is
that legislatures are deemed cognizant of judicial decisions when pro-
mulgating legislation. 135 Accordingly, in those instances in which a
statute has been recodified subsequent to a judicial incorporation of
Taylor as the scope of permissible conduct, it is arguable that legislative
adoption of the incorporation through reenactment is sufficient to
render the statute unconstitutional, particularly since such statutes
may also be facially obtrusive to constitutional principles in the absence
of judicial interpretation.'36 In such instances legislatures have simply
done indirectly what they could not do directly: authorize the retrieval
of accused individuals without application of constitutional standards.
The only constitutional challenge to a surety arrest statute is
reported in the Michigan appellate decision of Citizens for Pre-Trial
Justice v. Goldfarb."7 The pertinent statute, which permitted the surety
to summarily arrest the principal without a hearing, was determined by all
three justices to constitute "state action," thereby invoking constitu-
tional analysis." Justice Cavanagh balanced the liberty interest of the
"I The Supreme Court has established that knowledge of statutory provision
is a prerequisite to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the statute is asserted
as "under color of" law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).
The subjective knowledge of the bondsman was considered dispositive in
Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1979), which distinguished deci-
sions wherein the bondsman "did not act or purport to act" under the authority
of a state bench warrant. Id. at 801.
" See, e.g., legislative history of statutory provisions cited in note 131 supra.
" See, e.g., Young v. Brashears, 560 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1977).
" See notes 137-42 infra and accompanying text. See also Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967), which held as violative of the fourteenth amendment an
amendment to the California Constitution which was racially neutral.
17 88 Mich. App. 519, 278 N.W.2d 653 (1979).
" The dissent of Justices Brennan and Holbrook does not appear to refute
Justice Cavanagh's determination that state action existed. Instead, the Justices
deemed the statute to be constitutional when the "balancing process" included
not only the liberty interest of the individual and the interest of the state in rear-
resting the accused, but also the "private nature of [the] bail contract, and the
bondsman's interest therein." Id. at 565, 278 N.W.2d at 674.
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released individual against the state's interest in authorizing a sum-
mary arrest and concluded that the former "significantly"' 31 outweighed
the latter and declared the statute unconstitutional. Supreme Court
decisions which addressed the procedural safeguards that should accom-
pany the arrest of an individual possessed of a quasi-liberty interest,
such as a bailed individual, revealed that "at a minimum, judicial par-
ticipation prior to these occurrences and the opportunity for a hearing
is required."14 These analyses support Justice Cavanagh's findings.
Unfortunately, however, the two controlling Justices, Brennan and
Holbrook, while acknowledging the liberty interest of the individual,
proceeded to examine the contractual nature of the undertaking and the
common law principles enunciated in Taylor. They concluded that sum-
mary arrests did not constitute a deprivation of the released
individual's due process liberty interest."' It was noted by the majority
that the "bondsman's right to recapture and surrender the bailed defen-
dant represents a significant factor in the bondsman's undertaking."'' 2
This seems to support the proposition that unless summary arrest
authority is provided to them, no bonds will be written, and that the
writing of surety bonds is in the state interest. However, existence of
alternate methods of pretrial release, the ability of the surety to de-
mand collateral, and the legislative ability to authorize surety arrest in
accordance with statutory procedural safeguards (arguments which do
not appear to have been presented or considered) displays the fallacy of
the majority's logic. It would be myopic to conclude that the constitu-
tionality of statutes which permit the surety to summarily arrest the
principal is a settled topic.
IV. SECTION 1983 LIABILITY
"[I]n modern times, the bail bondsman is an arm of the court
performing a service in aid of criminal law. As such, he should
be subject to procedures that recognize and protect the rights of
the accused as much as do the other agents of law enforce-
ment."'
A principal seized in an abusive manner or otherwise in circumven-
tion of constitutional standards may attempt to secure legal redress in
139 Id. at 560, 278 N.W.2d at 671.
140 Id. at 560, 278 N.W.2d at 672.
"' Justice Cavanagh severely criticized the majority's contractual analysis:
"This focus in the nature of bail as a merely private undertaking ignores its reality
as a method of securing the constitutional and statutory right to bail." Id. at 561,
278 N.W.2d at 672.
, Id. at 566, 278 N.W.2d at 674.
"4 Hearing on S.2855 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) (remark of Hon.
Sam. J. Ervin, Jr.).
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the federal forum by initiating an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'" Such
an action will be permitted only upon a demonstration that the alleged
wrongful conduct occurred "under color of" law, the quasi-conceptual
equivalent of fourteenth amendment "state action,"'45 and that a
deprivation of constitutional rights resulted from such conduct."6 The
determination of whether state action exists is therefore pertinent to
both the utilization of a section 1983 action and delineation of the per-
missible scope of surety conduct. The difficulty of applying a state ac-
tion analysis to the bondsman is reflected in the diverse judicial
pronouncements discussed below.
A. State Action Analysis
"The Supreme Court's state action doctrine 'has the flavor of
a torchless search for a way out of a damp echoing case.' "141
Section 1983 provides no legal redress for private conduct "however
discriminatory or worngful,"' 14' and aptly so since limiting application of
constitutional standards to state entities "stops the Constitution short
of preempting individual liberty." 149 However, that the bondsman does
not purport to act as a direct agent of the sovereign does not preclude a
determination that a nexus exists sufficient in stature so as to
transform the private conduct of the surety into the action of the state
for purposes of section 1983. The bondsman's conduct falls into the gray
area, somewhere between purely private and purely state action, where
the Supreme Court's attempt to formulate a doctrine pursuant to which
the "private" may be separated from the "state" has been aptly
categorized as a "conceptual disaster area.""'
1. Bondsman's Employment of Law Officers
When an off-duty law enforcement officer is employed as an agent of
the bondsman to effect the arrest, the state action requirement will be
:14 See note 7 supra.
"' The "state action" requirement of the fourteenth amendment and the
"under color of" law requirements of § 1983 have been construed by the Supreme
Court to be substantially the same. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794
n.7 (1966). Accord, Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1974)
(en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975); Ruffler v. Phelps Memorial Hosp., 453
F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Cf. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 211
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Tihe statutory term 'under color of any statute'
has a narrower meaning than the constitutional concept of 'state action.' ").
' Both aspects of § 1983 are necessary and constitute separate areas of in-
quiry. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978); Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
17 Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword& "State Action," Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967).
141 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13
(1948).
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1149 (1978).
" Black, supra note 147, at 95.
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satisfied if the agent represents to the principal that the seizure is per-
formed in an official capacity, even if the apprehension constitutes a
clear excess of authority or the officer is otherwise without jurisdiction
to arrest."' Accordingly, in United States v. Trunko,"' the bondsman's
agent was an Ohio deputy sheriff who performed an out-of-state armed
arrest by "showing his badge,"'53 and the "under color of" law require-
ment was satisfied. It was held that the officer was a direct agent of the
sovereign, the court rejecting the argument that "he was acting purely
as an agent of the bonding company." ' 4 Judicial examination of the
bondsman-sovereign nexus is unnecessary. Law enforcement personnel
may not directly utilize nor invoke the coercive powers of the sovereign
by acting under color of uniform to simplify arrest without becoming
subject to liability for deprivation of constitutional rights as secured by
federal statutes such as section 1983.
2. State Action Doctrines
The Supreme Court, after decades of struggle, has reached
the conclusion that the dichotomy of "private" and "state" ac-
tion has "no easy answer.""'
Commentators are uniform in their criticism of the Court's inability to
formulate clear and coherent factors pursuant to which the dichotomy
may be relieved or to apply with consistency those theories which had
evolved."" The "astounding unpredictability of the doctrine and the
151 See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (§ 1983 ac-
tion); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) (§ 1983 action); Williams v. United
States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951) (a private detective holding a special policeman's card
issued by municipality acting under color of law when he apprehended in-
dividuals accused of theft and extorted confessions under physical duress);
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11
(1944) ("state action"); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 244,
246 (1931) ("state action"); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278
(1913) ("state action").
"' 189 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Ark. 1960). This action was a prosecution for willfully
depriving, under color of law, an inhabitant of Arkansas of rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution and initiated under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the
criminal analogue to § 1983. The Court found state action and a constitutional
deprivation, but did not find a "willful" deprivation, an element of § 242 which is
not present in § 1983. Id.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 562.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974).
1 See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978); Ely, The
Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword, 92 HARV. L. REV. (1978) [hereinafter
cited as 1977 Foreword]; Antoun, State Action: Judicial Perpetuation of the
State/Private Distinction, 2 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 722 (1975); Black, The Supreme
Court 1966 Term-Foreword. "State A ction, "Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967); Glennon & Nowak, A Functional
Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SuP.
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uncertain potential of its application""15 has prompted some commen-
tators to advocate a departure from the "traditional" approach of con-
sidering state action as a threshold criteria. Some have called for the
adoption of a "revisionist" approach of considering state action as only
one factor in determining whether constitutional standards should apply
to the ostensibly private conduct.'58 However, the revisionist theory
has been soundly rejected by the Supreme Court; state action remains a
threshold criteria which must be satisfied in its own right before an ex-
amination of the magnitude of the constitutional deprivation may be
conducted. '59
Essentially three pertinent "doctrines," however unworkable and un-
predictable, have emerged from Supreme Court analysis of state action
and will be discussed seriatim: (1) public function, (2) encouragement or
authorization, and (3) significant state involvement. Application of these
doctrines to the conduct of bondsmen will demonstrate that bondsmen
CT. REV. 221; Rowe, The Emerging Threshold Approach to State Action Deter-
minations: Trying to Make Sense of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 69 GEo. L.J.
745 (1981); Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action"Limit
on The Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855 (1966); Thompson,
Piercing the Veil of State Action: The Revisionist Theory and a Mythical Ap-
plication to Self-Help Repossession, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1; Van Alstyne & Karst,
State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961); Note, State Action: Theories for Apply-
ing Constitutional Restrictions to Privacy Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as State Action: Theories]; Note, State Action After Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co.: Analytical Framework for a Restrictive Doctrine, 81
DICK. L. REV. 315 (1977) [hereinafter cited as State Action After Jackson]; Note,
Presence of State Action in United States v. Weber, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1172
[hereinafter cited as State Action in Weber]; Note, The State Action Conundrum
Reexamined& A New Approach and its Application to the Constitutionality of
Creditor Self-Help Remedies, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 414 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Conundrum Reexamined]; Note, State Action and the Public Function Doctrine:
Are There Really Public Functions?, 13 U. RICH. L. REv. 579 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as State Action and the Public Function Doctrine]; Note, State Action and
the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840 (1974) [hereinafter cited as State Action and
the Burger Court]; Note, Creditors'Remedies As State Action, 89 YALE L.J. 538
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Creditors' Remedies].
157 Thompson, supra note 156, at 9.
" See generally Thompson, supra note 156; Glennon & Nowak, A Functional
Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SuP.
CT. REV. 221.
11 The Rehnquist trilogy has considered state action as a threshold issue. See
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). The
revisionist approach has been severely criticized:
Even though the proposed balancing text assures that not every private
wrong would be a constitutional violation, still it makes every private ac-
tion a subject of constitutional scrutiny and thereby largely ignores the
role that the states have in protecting their citizens. The only way to
preserve the institutional values that are reflected in the state action
limitation is to retain some threshold test ....
1977 Foreword, supra note 156, at 127 n.36.
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act "under color of" law and that constitutional limitations are ap-
plicable to their conduct. 6 '
a. The Public Function Doctrine
Under the public function theory a private entity performing a func-
tion which is traditionally and exclusively reserved to the sovereign is
held to the constitutional limitations thereof, regardless of governmen-
tal involvement in such conduct.161 The principle was initially establish-
ed in a series of actions challenging the exclusion of blacks from par-
ticipation in primary elections,"2 and was thereafter applied to a series
of actions challenging the prohibition of exercise of first amendment
rights on private property functionally equivalent to the streets or
sidewalks of a municipality such as a company-owned town"' or a shop-
ping center."4
The public function doctrine applies only to those powers which are
traditionally reserved to the sovereign. In Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Company,65 a privately owned and operated utility corporation
was challenged as violating the due process rights of a customer by ter-
minating the latter's electric service without notice or opportunity to
pay outstanding obligations. The court found no state action under the
public function theory. The rationale was that the sovereign had no
obligation to furnish utility services and such service was not "tradi-
tionally associated with sovereignty. 66
The latest Supreme Court "state action" decision, Flagg Brothers,
Inc. v. Brooks,67 firmly limited application of the public function doc-
trine to those powers which are "traditionally exclusively reserved to
166 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
161 For more detailed discussion of the public function theory see State Action
and the Public Function Doctrine, supra note 156; Antoun, supra note 156, at
735-36; State Action: Theories, supra note 156, at 690-98; State Action After
Jackson, supra note 156, at 334-35.
162 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
16 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (Jehovah's Witness possessed first
amendment right to distribute religious literature on streets of company-owed
town).
16 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that a
state constitutional provision giving an individual the right to solicit signatures
and distribute pamphlets at a private shopping center does not violate the
owner's property rights under the fifth amendment).
165 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
166 Id. at 353.
167 436 U.S. 149 (1978). For discussion of Flagg Brothers, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 105-09 (1978 & Supp. 1979); Creditors' Remedies, supra
note 156 (criticizing Supreme Court for not applying the "significant state in-
volvement" test of state action to the fact situation); Rose, supra note 156.
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the State."'68 In Flagg Brothers, a sale by a warehouseman pursuant to a
self-help provision of the New York Uniform Commercial Code was
challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment. No state action was found under the
public function theory since "the settlement of disputes between deb-
tors and creditors is not traditionally an exclusive public function."'69
The requirement of exclusivity was determined in Flagg Brothers to im-
plicitly exist in all previous public function decisions and was specifical-
ly enunciated and recognized, correctly or incorrectly, as a direct ele-
ment of the public function doctrine.
Application of the public function theory to the bondsman nec-
essitates an examination of whether the power to arrest a principal is
reserved to the state exclusively. It is initially noted that exercise of
the police power to secure and promote the general welfare of the
public is a right reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. t ' A
private individual who has been delegated such power is generally
recognized as exercising state action. For example, arrests of suspected
shoplifters by private security guards as authorized by statute con-
stitute action "under color of" law as delegation of the sovereign's police
power.' That the sovereign statutorily authorizes the bondsman to ar-
rest the principal is evidence in itself that such arrest authority is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereign. Delegation of such
power does not divest the state of the "traditional" power to arrest or
of the "exclusive" authority to control such power by revoking any
delegation. By prohibiting surety arrests, or establishing conditions
precedent to arrest such as the requiring of a certified copy of the con-
18 436 U.S. at 157.
Id. at 161.
1 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
"' Thompson v. McCoy, 425 F. Supp. 407 (D.S.C. 1976) (false arrest by store
security guard held state action since statute authorizing detectives to make ar-
rest was effectively a grant of a police power); accord, DeCarlo v. Joseph Horne
& Co., 251 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Pa. 1966). Distinguishably, statutes which authorize
department store detectives to temporarily detain suspected shoplifters do not
render such detention "under color of" law. See White Schrivner Corp., 594 F.2d
140, 143 (5th Cir. 1979); Draeger v. Grand Central, Inc., 504 F.2d 142 (10th Cir.
1974); Battle v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 388 F. Supp. 900 (D. Minn. 1975); Warren v.
Cummings, 303 F. Supp. 803 (D. Colo. 1969); Weyandt v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 279
F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
State licensing of detectives also does not create state action. See Jenkins v.
White Castle Systems, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 981, 982 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Estate of Iodice
v. Gimbels, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1054 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). For further discussion see
Note, The Merchant, The Shoplifter, and The Law, 55 MINN. L. REv. 825 (1971);
Annot., 44 A.L.R. FED. 225-96 (1979) (actionability, under § 1983, of claims against
persons other than police officers for unlawful arrest or imprisonment).
19811
37Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
tract, a bail piece or an arrest warrant, the state can exercise its power
to control arrest. Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb"' represents
the only reported decision which applied the public function theory to
the bondsman. The majority concluded that "professional bondsmen ...
exercise a power which is clearly a traditional adjunct of the state's
sovereignty: the power to arrest,"'. 73 and adjudged unconstitutional a
statute which permitted the surety to summarily arrest the principal
without due process protections.
The issue, therefore, is whether the long-standing common law rights
of the surety preclude a determination that the sovereign's right to ar-
rest the principal (as opposed to exercising a general power of arrest) is
"traditional" or "exclusive." Common law rights existed only because
the sovereign was an active party to the contractual undertaking and
chose to implicitly delegate that which would otherwise be an exclusive
responsibility of the state, namely custody and retrieval of an accused
individual. Delegation of that which is traditionally exclusively within
the sovereign's jurisdiction, for however long a period or in whatever
manner, should not be dispositive in ascertaining what functions are
public.
In sum, a strong argument can be made that the public function
theory is applicable to the bondsman and that surety conduct may prop-
erly be considered as state action to invoke constitutional limitations.
b. State Encouragement or Authorization
A second doctrine which has emerged from Supreme Court decisions is
the state encouragement or authorization theory, whereby private con-
duct is held to be properly attributable to the sovereign because the latter
has enacted a statute or otherwise authorized or encouraged the con-
duct. The best example of this doctrine is Reitman v. Mulkey.' Califor-
nia's Proposition 14, an amendment to the California Constitution which
prohibited the state legislature from denying, limiting or abridging,
"directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires
to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property to such person or
persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses,"' 7 5 was held to con-
stitute state action and violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Although Proposition 14 was racially neutral,
its ultimate effect was to repeal antidiscrimination statutes and thereby
"authorize racial discrimination in the housing market"'76 and
"significantly encourage and involve the state in private dis-
criminations.' 1
77
172 88 Mich. App. 519, 278 N.W.2d 653 (1979).
173 278 N.W.2d at 670.
174 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
171 Id. at 371 n.2.
176 Id. at 381.
177 Id
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Approximately a decade later the encouragement and authorization
theory was severely curtailed in Flagg Brothers.' The Court in Flagg
Brothers added the criteria that the state "compel" the private action
and not simply encourage or authorize the same."9 Applying this restric-
tive and perhaps "unduly narrow"'"8 test, the Rehnquist Court deter-
mined that a New York statute which permitted a warehouseman to sell
goods to cover unpaid obligations could not be considered as a basis of
state action since such statute "permit[ted] but [did] not compel" the
sale.'
Application of the encouragement or authorization theory to the
bondsman necessitates an examination of whether a state statute, which
provides the surety with an arrest power, "compels" the ultimate appre-
hension. Since no action which is fundamentally private and voluntary
may be compelled or mandated by the sovereign, it is perhaps too strin-
gent to define "compel," as utilized in Flagg Brothers, as mandating af-
firmative conduct. Rather, in Flagg Brothers the "compel" test appears
to be satisfied by a demonstration that the statute authorized and en-
couraged the conduct and no alternate means or methods were available
to achieve the ultimate desired result. The warehouseman in Flagg
Brothers possessed obvious alternative (though arguably more burden-
some) methods of pursuing his rights as a creditor, such as an action at
law or arranging a payment schedule with the debtor. The statutory
authorization to sell the debtor's possessions merely constituted an addi-
"1 436 U.S. 149 (1978). See notes 167-76 supra and accompanying text for fur-
ther discussion of Flagg Brothers.
' The Court noted:
Our cases state "that a State is responsible for the ... act of a private
party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act." Adickes, [398
U.S. 144, 170 (1969)]. This Court, however, has never held that a State's
mere acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that of
the State.
436 U.S. at 164. Interestingly, the Court made no attempt to distinguish Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), even though Proposition 14 clearly did not compel
discriminatory conduct.
"I Flagg Brothers has been the subject of much-deserved criticism:
The Court's approach to the state encouragement doctrine is also unduly
narrow. It is true enough, as Justice Rehnquist observes, that a state's
"mere acquiescence" in a private action does not by itself constitute
state action, but this truism misconceives the issue. The simplistic
dichotomy of "compulsion" and "mere acquiescence" renders that state
encouragement doctrine meaningless because the cases addressed by
the doctrine are precisely those where the private act is not directly
compelled by the state. In these cases the Court should broadly consider
the effect of the state's laws on the system or private relationships and
the pattern of private actions, rather than make everything depend on
the search for some decisive direct connection between the state and the
specific private act that is at issue.
The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 123-30 (1978).
"'1 436 U.S. at 156.
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tional method pursuant to which the warehouseman could obtain finan-
cial redress. Had the statute in Flagg Brothers been more compelling
and not just an alternative method, the court could possibly have found
the action to be "state action."'
82
Bondsmen, however, may not only be authorized and encouraged to
arrest their principal pursuant to a statute, but may be compelled to do
so. This would be true whenever there were no alternate means avail-
able for fulfilling the responsibility of surrendering the principal to the
sovereign and thereby achieving the desired result of preventing a for-
feiture of the bond. When arrest and surrender of the principal provide
the only method, not an additional method, by which the surety may
prevent a financial loss, the bondsman is "compelled" to arrest.
The "compel test" is not so easily satisfied, however, when the bonds-
man has alternate methods of preventing a financial loss. When the per-
tinent statute enables the surety to employ the services of law enforce-
ment personnel and when the ultimate apprehension may be effected
within the jurisdiction of such peace officers, or when foreclosure may
be undertaken on a collateral pledge which is sufficient to cover and
financial loss, arrest is but one alternative.
Arguably the "compel test" will fail if the statutory source of arrest is
viewed as cumulative and declaratory of the common law rights of the
surety since such statute cannot be considered as encouraging, authoriz-
ing or compelling conduct which was not previously permissible. How-
ever, this proposition merely shifts the focus of examination from the
state's statutory agency to its judicial agency. As the Supreme Court
noted as early as 1880, "a State may act through different
agencies,- either by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial
authorities; and the prohibitions of the [fourteenth] amendment extend
to all action of the State."'' 3 In Reitman v. Mulkey, the Court held Pro-
position 14 unconstitutional even though the proposed amendment
merely constitutionalized common law property rights. The Court fur-
ther held that Proposition 14 created "state action" since the ultimate
effect would be sovereign encouragement of racial discrimination in the
housing market.'84 If state constitutionalization of common law rights
may be considered state action, it appears obvious that state codifica-
tion of common law rights might equally be considered as state action
under the encouragement and authorization doctrine.'85 Thus, the bonds-
182 Id.
183 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880).
184 See notes 174-77 supra and accompanying text.
185 The effect of codification of common law rights within a state action con-
text is unresolved. As has been noted:
Some courts have suggested that for state action to be found under the
"reliance" theory, the statute in question must create rights that did not
exist at common law or must be enacted in contravention of a constitu-
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man is compelled to effect an arrest whether the source of such power
is viewed as derivative of the state's common law, custom or codifica-
tion thereof.
In sum, application of the encouragement or authorization theory of
state action to the bondsman necessitates an examination of the surety's
alternate methods of avoiding financial loss and/or surrendering the prin-
cipal. When the factual situation is such that the only method of prevent-
ing a forefeiture of the bond is through the arrest and surrender of the
principal, and a statute or common law right encourages and authorizes
the apprehension, it appears that such conduct may be considered "com-
pelled" within the meaning of Flagg Brothers, and state action exists.
Actions wherein the conduct of bondsmen has been considered as
state action pursuant to an implicit or express reliance upon the en-
couragement or authorization theory have not addressed the "compel
test" of Flagg Brothers and are thereby questionable precedent. In Hill
v. Toll.86 bondsmen who allegedly beat and robbed the principal were
determined, under principles of Reitman v. Mulkey, to act "under color of"
law for section 1983 purposes since the Pennsylvania statute authorized
such arrest and thereby "placed the imprimatur of the state on the con-
duct permitted by that section and . . . thereby encouraged such con-
duct." '187 Maynard v. Kear88 was an action wherein bondsman's agents
allegedly forcibly entered the principal's apartment, seized and beat
him, then coercively transported him from Ohio to Virginia, all to avoid
forfeiture of a $100 bond. A Virginia statute providing that "upon the
tional goal. Others have argued convincingly that the issue should not be
left to turn upon the "vagaries of the past."
State Action After Jackson, supra note 156, at 331, referring to Davis v. Rich-
mond, 512 F.2d 201, 203 (1st Cir. 1975); see Kenly v. Miracle Properties, 412 F.
Supp. 1072, 1074-75 (D. Ariz. 1976) (presence or absence of common law origin of a
right is only one factor to be considered in state action analysis). See also
Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208, 216 (1957) (state action analysis is not depen-
dent upon separating rights derivative from common law from those rights defined
by legislation); Rowe, supra, note 156, at 746, wherein it is observed: "For example,
a state's common law of defamation is subject to first amendment challenge
without regard to the official or private capacity of the actors."
186 320 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
187 320 F. Supp. at 187. It was further stated that "here, when [the surety] or
its agent arrest and surrender its principals, we assume that they knowingly act
pursuant to [the arrest statute]." Id. at 187 (emphasis added). This assumption of
the knowledge of statutory authority may constitute an impermissible judicial
conclusion:
We have previously noted, with respect to a private individual, that
"[w]hatever else may also be necessary to show that a person has acted
'under color of [a] statute' for purposes of § 1983, .. .we think it essential
that he act with the knowledge of and pursuant to that statute."
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978) (citation omitted).
1 474 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
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application of the surety, the court, . . . shall issue a capias for the arrest
of such principal, and such capias may be executed by such surety, or
his authorized agent,"' 189 was determined to provide the requisite state
action since "(bjy this statute, the State of Virginia [lended] its authority
to private bondsmen."
19
0
In the 1979 decision of Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb,'91 the
constitutionality of a statute which authorized a summary arrest of the
principal without procedural safeguards was challenged, and the court
concluded, without benefit of examining either Reitman or Flagg
Brothers, that a state action finding could not "be premised on the
statute's 'encouragement' of the rearrest procedures." '192 The preceden-
tial value of this statement must be considered de minimus.
In Ouzts v. Maryland National Insurance Company,9 ' agents of a
Nevada bondsman allegedly apprehended the principal within California
and transported him to Nevada. The California statute, which allowed
California bondsmen to summarily arrest their principals, was not inter-
preted as promoting194 or fostering 95 the conduct since another California
statute specifically prohibited foreign bondsman from effecting an ar-
rest within California until certain procedural safeguards had been sat-
isfied." The logic of this conclusion is without challenge. Unfortunately,
the pertinent issue of whether the Nevada statute authorized or en-
couraged the apprehension was not addressed, presumably because it
authorized retrievals only within the jurisdiction of Nevada. 97
Both logic and legal precedent support the proposition that the con-
duct of the surety may be encouraged, authorized or compelled by a
state statute thereby rendering such conduct state action even within
the restrictive definition of Flagg Brothers.
c. Significant State Involvement
A third doctrine of state action analysis assumes a variety of titles in-
cluding "entwinement," "symbiotic relationship," "interdependence,"
199 Id. at 801, citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-.144 (1960).
' 474 F. Supp. at 801. In addition to implicitly applying the "authorization"
theory, it appears that the court considered the bondsman's agents as quasi-
agents of the sovereign since it cited with approval Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
130 (1964). 474 F. Supp. at 800.
191 88 Mich. App. 519, 278 N.W.2d 653 (1979).
,92 Id. at 555, 278 N.W.2d at 669.
192 505 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975).
9 505 F.2d at 553.
195 Id. at 554.
198 See notes 119-22 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of CAL.
PENAL CODE § 847.5 (West 1970), which establishes procedural criteria for out-of-
state bondsmen.
197 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.523 (1969). Note, however, that dissenting
Justices Hufstedler, Merrill, Cuniway and Ely felt that the agents acted "under
color of' Nevada law. See 505 F.2d at 555-62.
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"partnership," "significant state involvement," "joint venture," "joint
enterprise" and "sufficiently close nexus."'' 0 This doctrine was first
utilized in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority. 9' Hence, the Court
held the private conduct of a restaurant owner leasing space in a build-
ing financed by public funds and owned by a state agency to constitute
state action and a deprivation of equal rights. The restauranteur had ex-
cluded black patrons solely on account of their race. This constituted a
deprivation of rights as secured by the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment:
The state has so far insinuated itself into a position of inter-
dependence with [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a
joint participant in the challenged activity, which on that ac-
count, cannot be considered to have been so "purely private" as
to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
The significant state involvement theory has been applied in
numerous post-Burton decisions."' Unfortunately, this doctrine is as dif-
ficult in its application as it is necessary as a method of judicial analysis.
Vacuous terms such as "nexus" or "entwinement," which by their nature
defy a functional legal definition, must be interpreted within the context
of the factual situation in which they have been utilized. The preceden-
tial value of such narrow decisions in a factually deviant context is
never obvious. Rather, "[ojnly by sifting facts and weighing cir-
cumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private con-
duct be attributed its true significance.""2 2
Certain state conduct such as federal funding,2 3 licensing204 or regula-
199 See generally Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974);
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787 (1966); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). For further discussion see L. TRIBE, supra note
156, at 1271; Antoun, supra note 156, at 729; Nevin, State Action: The Significant
State Involvement Doctrine After Moose Lodge and Jackson, 14 IDAHO L. REV.
647 (1978) (state action theory coherent); Thompson, supra note 156, at 6; State
Action in Weber, supra note 156, at 1180; State Action After Jackson, supra note
156, at 336; State Action and the Burger Court, supra note 156.
1 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
20 Id. at 725.
201 See citations in note 198 supra and notes 203, 221 infra.
0 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
203 Receipt of federal funding does not convert conduct of institutions such as
private universities into state action. See Greenya v. George Washington Univ.,
512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 955 (1975); Spark v. Catholic Univ.,
510 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137
(2d Cir. 1973); Madon v. Long Island Univ. C.W. Post Center, 518 F. Supp. 246
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
20I Feldman v. Jackson Memorial Hosp., 509 F. Supp. 815 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (state
licensing of private hospital insufficient nexus).
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tion,"' will generally not satisfy the involvement theory. In Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Company,"'0 a privately owned and operated utility
corporation was found to lack a "sufficiently close nexus"20 7 to the
sovereign so as to invoke the applicable constitutional limitations
despite extensive governmental regulation. The theory that state regula-
tion of a corporation will support a sufficient state action nexus was vir-
tually abolished in Jackson since a situation involving more extensive
governmental regulation is improbable."'
It is posited that the sovereign is significantly involved with the con-
duct of the bondsman so as to attach to the latter the constitutional
limitations applicable to the former. A summary of the bondsman-state
nexus is appropriate. The sovereign, as custodian over the person of the
accused, possesses the exclusive authority to dictate the conditions pur-
suant to which pretrial release may be secured. The posting of a cor-
porate bond is required even though the state's interest of assuring the
appearance of the accused may be protected through utilization of alter-
nate proven pretrial release methods.0 9 In order to secure the fun-
damental constitutional right to bail,210 the accused is essentially coerced
'0' Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
206 Id.
207 Id. at 351. The "sufficiently close nexus" test of Jackson must be considered
as a variation of the symbiotic relationship test of Burton discussed in notes
198-99 supra and accompanying text. Obviously Jackson does not overrule Burton.
See Chalfant v. Wilmington Inst., 574 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc); Downs v.
Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); Braden v. Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc); Holodnak v. Avco Corp.,
514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
" The Court noted: "The mere fact that a business is subject to state regula-
tion does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 419 U.S. at 350. In Lemmons v. Tranbraw, 425 F. Supp.
496 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), the principles enunciated in Jackson were applied directly
to the bondsman. Regulation, in and of itself, was determined to be "[insufficient]
to convert [the bondsman's] conduct into that of the state for the purpose of the
14th Amendment or 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983." Id. at 498-99. Compare, however, Ouzts v.
Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949
(1975) (Hufstedler, Browning, Duniway, Ely, JJ., dissenting), wherein state action
was found to exist when state regulation was considered as one of several
cumulative factors. See note 225 infra and accompanying text.
Commentators have observed that "[a]s regulation in no way enhances private
powers of the regulated party, but rather limits those powers, challenged con-
duct cannot be made more effective by this form of involvement. It is difficult,
therefore, to understand how a 'state action' finding could be predicated upon
regulation." State Action: Theories, supra note 156, at 659. See also Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (Pennsylvania State Liquor Control Board
regulations did not encourage racial discrimination in a private club so as to pro-
vide a nexus for state action); State Action After Jackson, supra note 156, at
326-28 (and citations therein).
See notes 34-49 supra and accompanying text.
210 See note 10 supra.
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into executing a contractual undertaking where the bondsman demands
conditions repugnant to the principles of the Constitution."' This con-
tract secures the full blessing of the sovereign and possesses the
authority to require a condition precedent for entering into this "tri-
party arrangement," 1 ' namely that the surety-principal contract permits
seizure only as attended by procedural and/or substantive safeguards.
By releasing the principal to the bondsman the sovereign is relieved of
the financial expenses and legal liabilities incurred in the guarding and
maintenance of the principal as a prisoner.
Most importantly, the state delegates by statute to the surety those
powers which are typically reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of a
sovereign, i.e., power to arrest."3 These statutes provide a source of
authority which must be considered as independent of the contractual
and common law sources of arrest powers. It is typical for a statute to
enable the bondsman to utilize the services of state law enforcement
personnel while effecting the seizure."' Even if peace officers do not
directly participate in the apprehension, refusal to intervene on the
principal's behalf implies consent, particularly when the surety utilizes
force in excess of that which is necessary.
21 5
The absence of procedural or substantive standards attending this
statutory arrest authority displays at best a legislative laissez-faire at-
titude towards the apprehension procedures utilized by bondsmen, and
at worst a direct approval and encouragement thereof. The judiciary
often becomes directly involved in the arrest procedure by issuing to
the surety a certified copy of the bond, a bail piece or an arrest warrant
which serves as the authority to effect a seizure.1 '
It is customary for law enforcement personnel to aid the bondsman in
locating the accused by providing access to nonpublic investigatory
records and to assist the retrieval by permitting utilization of jail
facilities during transportation. ' A foreign jurisdiction, serving as
211 See notes 53-65 supra and accompanying text.
212 Allied Fidelity Corp. v. C.I.R., 572 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 835 (1978).
213 See notes 127-34 supra and accompanying text.
214 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-628 (1947).
zs Dunkin v. Lamb, 500 F. Supp. 184 (D. Nev. 1980) (police refused to in-
tervene); Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (detention center officials
allegedly refused to aid principal who was beaten and robbed by bondsmen in
their presence). But see Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794, 800 (N.D. Ohio 1979)
("It]he police officers took precautions initially to prevent trouble from occurring,
responded to the call for assistance, prevented further fighting between [the
principal] and the bondsmen, and investigated at great length the bondsmen's
authority to act as they did.").
216 See citations in note 129 supra and statutes construed therein.
2 Investigatory assistance is discussed in Note, Bail Bondsmen: An Alter-
native, 6 SUFFOLK L. REV. 937, 938-40 (1972).
19811
45Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
custodian over the principal, will often surrender the same into the
direct custody of the surety upon application." ' Finally, bondsmen are
often heavily regulated by statute or judicial rule."1 "
Simply, the bondsman is created by the sovereign and then given
coercive powers to provide custodial and retrieval services as the
state's alter ego. The "nonobvious involvement of the State" ' is facially
evident, and the nexus between the sovereign and the bondsman is
arguably so sufficient in statute as to satisfy the significant state in-
volvement test which has been held applicable in instances where the
sovereign's conduct was far less obvious. 21
The symbiotic relationship between the surety and the sovereign has
received only two significant judicial examinations. In Citizens for Pre-
Trial Justice v. Goldfarb2 . Justice Cavanagh found such a relationship
within the meaning of Jackson and Burton. He noted that the sovereign
received significant benefits by releasing the individual to the custody
of the bondsman whose "relationship with the court is quasi-official."2 3
A more extensive examination was undertaken in Ouzts v. Maryland
218 Golla v. State, 50 Del. 497, 135 A.2d 137 (1957); see Fitzpatrick v. Williams,
46 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1931).
219 See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
' See Barnhorst v. Missouri State High School Activities Ass'n, 504 F. Supp.
449 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (close identification of functions served by state high school
activities association with the state's provision of education was sufficient nexus
to transmute challenged rule of association into state action); Swann v. Gastonia
Housing Authority, 502 F. Supp. 362, 365 (W.D.N.C. 1980) (conduct of private
landlord was state action since a sufficient nexus existed with the federal govern-
ment pursuant to the "numerous benefits [derived] from participating in [a
federal Housing program]"); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber,
506 F. Supp. 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 650 F.2d 430 (1981) (State fair operators'
requirement that solicitation of money for religious purposes be restricted to a
booth was "state action" since state funded operation of fair, provided grounds
and police patrols); Yaretsky v. Blum, 629 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1980) (hospital with
Medicaid patients sufficiently close in nexus to federal government), cert. denied,
- U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 1379 (1981). Cf. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 641 F.2d 14 (1st
Cir. 1981) (conduct of teachers at small, nonprofit school not state action even
though funded from government sources, school extensively regulated and
diploma was certified by town school committee), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278
(U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 80-2102); Foster v. Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142, 1147 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (government's involvement in operation of Smithsonian Science Informa-
tion Exchange sufficient to constitute the type of symbiotic relationship found in
Burton); Bloomer Shippers Ass'n v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 655 F.2d 772 (7th
Cir. 1981) (use of courthouse not state action); Joseph v. Community Action
Comm'n to Help the Economy, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (community
action agency not state action though public officials sat on board and substantial
public funds received); Lestrange v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 501 F. Supp. 964
(M.D. Pa. 1980).
88 Mich. App. 519, 278 N.W.2d 653 (1979).
Id. at 558, 278 N.W.2d at 671.
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National Insurance Company... where the dissenting Justices deter-
mined that the state had "insinuated itself into a position of inter-
dependence"2 ' with the surety by licensing and regulating the same,
receiving benefits therefrom and delegating an "important public func-
tion""22 thereto. It was concluded that the conduct of the bondsman was
tantamount to state action, since "only through substantial governmen-
tal cooperation [was] it possible to maintain the system of quasi-private
bail that led to the violation of [the principal's] civil rights."2"7
The significant state involvement test is, by its nature, unpredictable.
However, it is difficult to imagine a nexus more complete than that
which exists between the surety and the sovereign, particularly when
the right to bail is constitutionally protected. Even a superficial analysis
of the interdependence between the bondsman and the state constrains
the conclusion that the conduct of the surety must be considered as
state action pursuant to the principles established in Burton and
Jackson.
3. Miscellaneous State Action Bondsmen Decisions
Several decisions which have addressed the conduct of bondsmen as
state action should be mentioned. In McCaleb v. Peerless Insurance
Company,228 a bondsman's agents shackled and controlled the activity of
the principal for approximately eighty hours without surrendering the
latter to the sovereign's custody. Action was initiated in the federal
forum under state tort law and section 1983. The court concluded that
"Ujurisdiction exists ... under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331," '229
the federal question statute, thereby implying that a variable constitu-
tional action had been plead. The court did not address the existence of
state action which constitutes a prerequisite to constitutional applica-
tion, thus rendering the decision of little precedential value for "state
action" cases.
In Thomas v. Miller,"' where sureties allegedly shackled the principal
and treated him "roughly,"23' a section 1983 action was dismissed pur-
suant to the determination that the bondsmen "were acting by reason of
a contractual relationship with him" and "[tihat which was done by the
[bondsmen] was not a state action." '232 No state action analysis was con-
ducted, whereby the court could first determine its jurisdiction to con-
2 505 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975).
, 505 F.2d at 558.
221 Id. at 557.
Id.
228 250 F. Supp. 512 (D. Neb. 1965).
22 Id. at 513.
23 282 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
231 Id. at 572.
232 Id. at 573.
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sider a contractual defense. In Curtis v. Peerless Insurance Company, 3'
a section 1983 action founded upon the principal's averred constitutional
right to be free from unlawful seizure was dismissed since the principal
had not plead "even a vapor of evidence"2 34 that the surety's conduct
was under color of law. Last, in Easley v. Blossom3 a section 1983 ac-
tion was dismissed for lack of state action. In a classic example of the
blind leading the blind, the Easley court conducted no independent state
action analysis but simply cited as controlling Thomas v. Miller and Curtis
v. Peerless Insurance Company.3 '
It is noted that several actions"' have been asserted unsuccessfully
against bondsmen under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),2"8 which provides a federal
cause of action against persons who conspire to deprive another of the
"equal protection of the laws." '239 The 1971 Supreme Court decision of
Griffin v. Breckenridge24 eliminated the state action requirement of sec-
tion 1985(3), thereby creating a quasi-constitutional action to be asserted
against private individuals. The Court, obviously concerned that elimi-
nation of the state action requirement would preempt many areas of
tort law which had traditionally been reserved to the states and thereby
violate principles of federalism, noted that "[tlhe language requiring in-
tent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities,
means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." '41
23 299 F. Supp. 429 (D. Minn. 1969).
23 Id& at 434.
131 394 F. Supp. 343 (S.D. Fla, 1975).
236 Id. at 345. The Court also dismissed the action as founded upon 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) pursuant to an absence of state action, even though the state action "re-
quirement" of that statutory provision had been eliminated by the Supreme
Court four years earlier in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
37 Curtis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp. 429 (D. Minn. 1969); see Easley v.
Blossom, 394 F. Supp. 343 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Smith v. Rosenbaum, 333 F. Supp. 35
(E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1972); see also Maynard v. Kear, 474
F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
- 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) states:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the con-
stituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to
all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the
laws; .. .the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against
any one or more of the conspirators.Id.
239 Id.
240 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
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Accordingly, racial classes are expressly recognized as protected under
section 1985(3). The Supreme Court left open the composition of classes,
other than racial, which may be subjected to discrimination charges
under section 1985(3). It is extremely doubtful that the class of "prin-
cipals" would be such a protected class."2 However, gender and religion
are so protected.2 "3 Accordingly, a principal may state a recognized
cause of action against bondsmen or their agents under section 1985(3) if
the latter conspires to deprive the principal of a right secured by the
equal protection of the laws and if the discriminatory acts are directed
towards a protected class such as race, religion or gender. No reported
decision where the conduct of the bondsman has been challenged has
satisfied these criteria to date, although such a decision is certainly
possible.
B. Constitutional Deprivation
A viable section 1983 claim necessitates a demonstration of state ac-
tion and a constitutional deprivation. " Once the bondsman's conduct
has been classified as state action, then constitutional limitations attach.
The constitutional boundaries of permissible surety "state action" con-
duct are undefined but not beyond speculation. Until the principal flees
or otherwise violates a contractual condition of the bail undertaking, the
principal is arguably possessed of a due process liberty interest similar
to a parolee. 45 If a principal absconds, he may be deemed to possess, at a
minimum, those basic constitutional rights which attach to an individual
241 Id. at 102 (emphasis in original).
22 The open-ended nature of Griffin has resulted in divergent but largely
reconcilable decisions among the lower federal courts. Decisions have generally
demonstrated a reluctance to extend the scope of § 1985(3) beyond the confines of
Griffin. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972) (class of
criminal attorneys not protected); Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973) (doctor who testified in malpractice suits not a §
1985 class); see also Carchman v. Korman Corp., 594 F.2d 354 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 989 (1979) (tenant organizers not protected); Baskin v. Parker,
602 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1979) (white farm families not protected class); McLellan v.
Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (bankrupts
not protected); Askew v. Bloemaker, 548 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1976) (homeowners
raided by federal drug enforcement agents not protected); United States v.
DeLaurentis, 491 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1974) (unfair Labor practice not cognizable
under 18 U.S.C. § 241, the criminal analogue to § 1985(3)).
24 Actions wherein a class-based conspiracy involved discriminations to a
racial animus, such as religion, national origin or gender, have generally been
held to create cognizable § 1985(3) suits. Cf. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt,
591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979) (women protected class); Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489
F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973) (members of Jewish faith protected); see also Conroy v.
Conroy, 575 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1978) (gender protected class); Action v. Gannon,
450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (worshippers at particular church protected class).
244 See note 146 supra.
245 See notes 106-09 supra and accompanying text.
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who has escaped from the custody of the sovereign. A complete analysis
of these rights exceeds the scope of this Article." ' It is noted, however,
that excessive force may not be utilized to effect an arrest. 4 ' An arrest
warrant or the equivalent thereof, such as a judicially certified copy of
the bond undertaking, will be required. Regarding arrests in third party
dwellings, the Supreme Court has recently held in Steagald v. United
States..8 that a law officer who enters the dwelling of a third party to ef-
fect the arrest of an individual therein violates the fourth amendment,
absent exigent circumstances or consent, if a search warrant has not
been obtained. An arrest warrant has been determined insufficient for
affecting such an arrest. Application of this principle to the bondsman
eliminates the viability of the narrow holding of Livingston v. Browder,
as discussed above.4 9 Other restrictions premised upon the first, sixth
and eighth amendments may also attach. 50 It is sufficient to note that
the existence of state action significantly limits the bondsman's per-
missible scope of conduct.
V. CONCLUSION
The professional bail bondsman is a legal anachronism whose tenacity
and ability to survive legislative reform and constitutitional scrutiny is
astounding. The justifications for the existence of the corporate surety
are superficial even when subjected to a cursory examination. The lack
of functional utility and absence of internal or external accountability
renders the surety both unnecessary and dangerous.
This quasi-judicial officer, created by the sovereign and provided with
its coercive powers, often escapes state action analysis and/or statutory
regulation. Thus, the judiciary is constrained to view Taylor v. Taintor
as the source and scope of the bondsman's powers even though the surety
provides a police service which is traditionally within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the sovereign. Judicial determinations that such powers
are derivative of the contractual nature of the undertaking are specious
246 The reader is referred to the references in note 54 supra, and to those deci-
sions wherein the conduct of bondsmen was construed as state action and the
alleged constitutional deprivation was examined. See Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l
Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1974); Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794 (N.D.
Ohio 1979); Smith v. Rosenbaum, 333 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d
1019 (3d Cir. 1972); Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1970); United States v.
Trunko, 189 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Ark. 1960); Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v.
Goldfarb, 88 Mich. App. 519, 278 N.W.2d 653 (1979).
2"7 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
248 U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981).
... See notes 90-95 supra and accompanying text.
In particular, examples include deprivations of freedom of association, ex-
tradition, and cruel and unusual punishment such as a denial of medical attention
when such is warranted under the principles of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976). See generally references in note 246 supra.
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and provide a superficial cloak for the role of the bondsman as the
state's alter ego. Public policy justification for the existence and power
of the bondsman, to the extent that such ever existed, is significantly
outweighed by the counterveiling public policy of preserving the con-
stitutional status of an individual merely accused of committing an of-
fense.
The important issue of whether the conduct of bondsmen constitutes
state action has received surprisingly little judicial attention. A small
number of jurists have pierced the "private" veil wherein the bondsman
seeks constitutional immunity and have characterized their conduct
as state action. Analysis of contemporary state action "doctrines"
reveals that the bondsman arguably possesses a symbiotic relationship
with the sovereign, performs a public function, and is encouraged,
authorized and even compelled to utilize police powers. Such analysis in-
dicates the propriety of those decisions where conduct of the surety has
been held to constitute state action. Indeed, implementation by the
sovereign of a bail system in which the bondsman serves as the corner-
stone and acquisition of the constitutionally protected right to bail may
only be achieved through a waiver of other constitutional protections, is
both ironic and absurd.
It is hoped that this Article will inform both litigants and jurists of
the application of state action analysis and constitutional limitations to
the bondsman. Sureties cannot be expected to engage in conduct which
conforms to constitutional principles until the judiciary consistently and
uniformly adjudges such conduct to be state action.
APPENDIX
Pre-Trial Release in the United States District Court, Northern District
of Ohio, Eastern Division (excluding Akron).*
TYPE RELEASED NOT RELEASED TOTAL
1980
Surety 18 ( 7%) 32 (13%) 50 ( 2 0%)
Ten Percent 33 ( 14%) 0 ( 0%) 33 ( 14%)
Personal
Recognizance 160 ( 65%) 0 (0%) 160 ( 6 5%)
(unsecured)
Cash 0( 0%) 3 (1%) 3( 1%)
TOTAL 246 (100%)
*Statistics are based upon all records which were sufficiently clear to
ascertain the type of bond required, and do not reflect cases where bond
was not applicable (e.g., corporate defendant, transfer of venue, accused
never rendered into custody, action dismissed, or bond set in transferring
district).
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TYPE
1979
Surety
Ten Percent
Personal
Recognizance
(unsecured)
Cash
TOTAL
RELEASED NOT RELEASED TOTAL
8 (6%)
14 (9%)
100 (67%)
0 (0%)
21 (13%)
4 (3%)
0 (0%)
3 (2%)
29 ( 19%)
18 ( 12%)
100 (67%)
3 (2%)
150 (100 %)
1978
Surety
Ten Percent
Personal
Recognizance
(unsecured)
Cash
TOTAL
14 ( 7% )
9 (4.5%)
154 (77%)
0 (0%)
35 (17.5%)
10 (5%)
154 (77%)
1 ( .5 %)
200 (100%)
21 (10.5%)
1 (.5%)
0 (0%)
1 (.5%)
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